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A bstract
This thesis uses general matching techniques - bo th  perfect matching and 
search - to  study some problems in economies th a t are characterised by het­
erogeneity of their agents. Here, matching in its broadest sense is interpreted 
as a form of trade th a t is strictly limited between two partners: transactions 
are one-to-one, between one buyer and one seller exactly.
The first part proposes a framework th a t integrates two well documented 
strands of the existing economic literature. I t  is a search model th a t gener­
alises the frictionless perfect matching model to  a context where trade does 
not occur instantaneously. A general methodology w ith  proof is given which 
allows us to  derive the unique equilibrium allocation of agents. Though 
the limit case w ithout friction reproduces the perfect m atching result, w ith  
friction results deviate substantially from conclusions in bo th  the perfect 
matching literature and the search literature.
The second part of the thesis concentrates entirely on frictionless m atch­
ing models. First, a general class of preferences is identified th a t yields a 
unique allocation. Second, the matching model is studied when endogenous 
choice of characteristics is allowed and has an intuitive application to  the 
labour market. I t  is shown th a t in  the presence of job heterogeneity, too 
many resources are spent in order to  achieve a higher ranked job. The re­
sults, including issues of turnover and distribution, are verified w ith  some 
stylised facts in  the empirical literature. Finally, a model th a t mimics a 
matching equilibrium and th a t allows for endogenous choice of characteris­
tics is applied to  the context of education in  the labour market. I t  is shown 
th a t multiple equilibria can exist in the presence of spillovers in  production.
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Introduction
Many behavioural and market interactions studied by economists are char­
acterised by a one-to-one transaction. In  a monogamic marriage m arket for 
example, exactly one partner of one sex ”trades” w ith  one partner of the 
other sex. A n individual’s decision in  the market is the choioe of a part­
ner, rather th an  the mere choice of the quantity consumed from whoever 
obtained. Associated w ith  a partner is a consumption level. Similarly, the 
one-to-one transaction accurately describes job markets. Firm s and workers 
both  choose exactly one partner to  engage in  production. This also applies 
to a large number of more traditional economic choioe situations. The choice 
of a college for education, for example, or the purchase of housing: an  addi­
tional unit (an extra course or an additional square meter) cannot be bought 
from a separate seller. All these transactions are characterised by the same 
feature: exchange is between two partners only.
In  th is thesis, the central theme is to  study several economic phenomena 
in the presence of markets where transactions are one-to-one. These markets 
will be referred to  as matching markets. They deviate from the standard 
W alrasian market in the sense th a t the one-to-one trading feature involves 
a non-trivial allocation decision. The choice of the trading partner, i.e. the 
characteristics of whom to  trade with, will have an effect on the equilibrium 
outcome. In  a m atching market, agents are not anonymous. This implicitly 
assumes some sort of heterogeneity between trading partners. If th a t were 
not the case, all agents would be entirely indifferent between different poten­
tial candidates. In  the W alrasian market, arbitrage across different agents 
exactly cancels out ex-ante heterogeneity. A second deviating feature is th a t 
w ith non-trivial allocation decisions, agreement about trade is bilateral: bo th
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parties have to  be willing to  trade. Both features, heterogeneity and the bi­
lateral agreement of a transaction, are present in the W alrasian market, bu t 
because of trivial allocation decisions, agents are indifferent. The indifference 
is entirely generated by the price mechanism th a t has equal unit prices across 
agents. In  the presence of Bertrand competition, the outside option of an  
epsilon unit disciplines prices across agents.
M atching is of course not new. There is a long trad ition  in economic re­
search dealing w ith  matching. Two m ain strands of the economic literature 
have independently focussed on many related issues: the work on perfect 
matching and the search literature. Perfect M atching was introduced by 
Gale and Shapley [27] in the early sixties. They observed some strong be­
havioural regularities in the market for hospital physicians. Their pioneering 
work involved modelling this matching market. In  subsequent research1, 
it was concluded th a t the preference structure is of crucial im portance for 
the equilibrium allocation, more so th an  the presence of transferability of 
utility2. The standard model, whether it be w ith  or w ithout transferable 
utility, features bo th  the ingredients mentioned above: bilateral agreement 
and heterogeneity. The second strand of the literature, search or imperfect 
m atching (i.e. matching w ith  frictions), acknowledges th a t trading opportu­
nities arrive a t a certain cost. The implication is th a t the intrinsic utility 
from consumption is no longer a perfect indicator of value. Value in addition 
is determined by the cost of creating the trad ing  opportunity. Such a cost 
can be interpreted as the cost of gathering information, or as the opportunity 
cost of waiting for the right trading opportunity. Search does not intrinsi­
cally and necessarily involve heterogeneity and bilateral agreement3. This
tyor an overview, see Rotli and Sotomayor [62].
2As in tlie model proposed by Becker [7].
3See for example tlie early literature on search: Mortensen [49], Diamond [17].
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however implies there is no decision of choice: upon meeting, a trade always 
takes place. The subsequent search literature has incorporated b o th  these 
features separately4.
The aim of this thesis is to  make contributions in  two areas. In  P a rt 
I, a unifying approach is proposed to  bo th  strands of the literature, perfect 
matching and search. The objective is to  establish how the characteristics of 
a generalised matching model w ith  search frictions differ from the existing 
results in the literature. In  P a rt II, perfect matching models are studied. 
This thesis tries to  make a contribution in the area of endogenous choice of 
characteristics of heterogeneous types. This is new in the literature and the 
presence of matching proves to yield results which differ substantially from 
the W alrasian benchmark. Throughout, the theory is employed to  explain 
economically relevant phenomena. It is constantly argued th a t m atching pro­
vides a good description of many phenomena, and th a t it highlights issues of 
heterogeneity which are not present in the standard neoclassical approach. 
It provides a theoretically rigorous framework in  which thinking about het­
erogeneity is natural. The applications then  are always to  be interpreted in  
term s of distribution of heterogeneous types. The m ain underlying social 
agenda is to  study the effect of distributional considerations on efficiency.
P a rt I consists of two Chapters. The first Chapter describes the model 
and derives the m ain results. The second Chapter considers some applica­
tions of the model w ith  surprising results. A search model is proposed of the 
marriage market between two sets, males and females, and it incorporates the
4Heterogeneity has been used, amongst others, in Jovanovic [32], Diamond [18] and 
Pissarides [56]. Bilateral agreement is prominent in the literature on money and search 
(Iviyotaki and Wright [33]) where a double coincidence of wants is necessary for trade. In 
addition, this presupposes some particular form of heterogeneity, horizontal heterogeneity.
two m ain features present in perfect matching models (i.e. w ithout search 
frictions). Bilateral search (i.e. search by both the males and the  females) 
and ex-ante vertical heterogeneity (some types are preferred to  others and 
all agents rank types identically) ensure th a t this model is the generalised 
version of the perfect matching model. I t differs from traditional search mod­
els because it jointly incorporates bo th  these features. As mentioned above, 
one approach (Kiyotaki and Wright [33]) does have bo th  features, bu t their 
specific notion of horizontal heterogeneity (i.e. each type prefers the types 
nearest to  her own type) implies th a t all agents have an identical strategy. 
The novelty of the results is threefold. First, a general methodology follows 
from the proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The method 
allows for the derivation of the equilibrium allocation whatever the utility 
function This includes the emergence of disconnected sets of matching for 
certain preferences. Second, a set of preferences is derived (i.e. satisfying 
multiplicative separability) th a t results in  the partitioning of bo th  distribu­
tions. Third, it is shown th a t the limit case of the search model w ith  the 
friction disappearing is the perfect matching model. This is new in  the sense 
th a t it deviates entirely from the existing models of search. Not only are ex­
isting models not the generalised version of the perfect matching model, they 
could never exhibit phenomena such as disconnected sets since heterogeneity 
only exists ex-post5. In  addition, our model differs in  more th a n  one respect 
from research th a t was conducted simultaneously and th a t  emerged after 
our results were found6. First, the proof is more general and in addition, it 
provides an intuitive method for solving for the equilibrium allocation. Sec­
ond, the model allows us to  show the equivalence w ith  the perfect matching
5See for example Diamond [18] and Pissarides [56].
6See for example McNamara and Collins [42], Burdett and Coles [13], Blocli and Ryder 
[12], Sattinger [64] and Smitli [69].
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model. Third, it has a more general result on partitioning th an  B urdett and 
Coles [13]7. One result th a t appears in the other work and th a t is absent in 
ours is the derivation of multiple endogenous distributions of singles.
In  the second Chapter, the model of Chapter 1 is used to  study two 
applications th a t have surprising results. First, it is shown th a t  bachelors 
may exist. Bachelors are the lowest types of one of the two distributions th a t 
remain eternally unmatched. This is surprising since in the perfect matching 
literature8, no one remains unmatched if bo th  populations are of equal size 
(and provided a m atch yields more utility th an  being single). The result here 
is due to  the difference in average length of search of bo th  sexes. If one sex, 
say the females, on average searches longer than  the males, th en  the lowest 
male types will never be matched. They involuntarily rem ain bachelors. 
This follows from the fact th a t matches are pairwise and th a t as a result, the 
number of agents matched per unit of tim e is equal in  bo th  sets. The second 
application abandons the assumption th a t matched partners are drawn from 
two disjoint sets and considers pairwise matching from one set. The example 
used to  illustrate the argument is the matching of tennis players as sparring 
partners. The result derived is th a t for certain preferences, it may be the 
case th a t some types refuse to play w ith types identical to  themselves. The 
reason is th a t when higher types are more im patient, they will be willing to 
accept matches w ith  low types. Such a low type, being more patient, can 
afford to wait until the more preferred higher types arrive and can refuse to  
m atch w ith equals. This provides one reason why you may not want to  be a 
member of the club th a t wants you as a member.
P a rt II abandons matching w ith  frictions entirely and concentrates on
7Tliougli tlie result on multiplicative separability has also been found by Smith [69].
8 See amongst others Becker [7] and Roth and Sotomayor [62].
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perfect matching models. In  Chapter 3, an extension is made to  the exist­
ing literature on perfect matching w ith ordinal preferences9. This literature 
has derived a large number of results on the existence of stable matchings 
for general preferences. The contribution of th is  Chapter is to  identify a 
class of preferences for which the stable matching is unique. This is useful 
from a purely theoretical point of view, since quite a large share of the non- 
cooperative game theory is concerned w ith  uniqueness. More im portantly 
however is th a t the class of preferences identified is wide and includes the 
ones w ith  the most economic relevance. Moreover, the  result bears some 
resemblance to  single-peakedness, even though th is is not entirely equivalent 
in a model w ith  agents from disjoint sets who have preferences over different 
objects (i.e. the types of the other set). This C hapter also makes a more 
philosophical point. It is shown th a t if assortative m ating is defined on the 
preferences, then  an allocation can never be negatively assorted. I t  is argued 
th a t assortative mating, i.e. the mating of likes, necessarily has to  be defined 
on the individuals’ preferences.
Chapter 4 considers the perfect matching model w ith  transferable utility. 
This does not differ substantially from the model w ith  ordinal preferences, 
bu t it allows for the derivation of pay-off functions from a joint surplus th a t is 
split between the partners of a match. The pay-off functions themselves are 
entirely derived from the surplus function and the allocation in  equilibrium 
for a given surplus. Becker [7] shows th a t for a surplus function which has 
a positive cross partia l derivative w ith  respect to  the types of bo th  sets (i.e. 
they are strategic complements), the equilibrium exhibits positive assortative 
mating. The allocation is negatively assorted w ith  a negative cross partial 
and agents are indifferent if the cross partial is zero. I t is derived in Chapter
9Tlris literature is reviewed in Rotli and Sotomayor [62].
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4 th a t in  this case, the distribution of types enters the pay-off function. This 
follows from the argument made above: in  a matching m arket w ith  one-to- 
one transactions, the allocation is non trivial. The innovative contribution 
is to  consider the endogenous choice of the characteristics of a type. The 
results th a t are shown have a strong bearing on the dependence of the pay­
off function on the distribution of types. In  this Chapter th is framework is 
embedded in the labour market where workers m atch w ith  jobs.
The central premise is th a t a distribution of heterogeneous jobs exists. 
The implication is th a t a worker’s productivity differs in different jobs. This 
deviates from most of the standard analysis where it is assumed th a t pro­
ductivity is entirely embodied in the worker. This implies th a t the allocation 
of workers to  jobs is non trivial. Once matched to  a job, a worker chooses 
the level of effort to exert. I t  is shown th a t in a repeated game, and w ith  
perfectly observable productivities, the level of effort is super optimal. This 
is the case if current effort affects the future type: performing well now 
makes a worker more productive in the future. In  effect, current effort en­
dogenously determines the future characteristic which in tu rn  determines the 
future equilibrium allocation. The inefficiency result is entirely in contrast 
w ith the neoclassical model of effort choice, where the equilibrium level is 
optimal. I t does bear some resemblance to  the reputation and principle- 
agent literature10, but the results stand w ith  perfect observability! Here, 
the result is derived from the rank dependence of the pay-off function in  a 
matching model. This follows from the non trivial allocation of workers to 
jobs. W ith  endogenous choice of characteristics, workers play a Rank-Order 
Tournament: current effort increases the rank in  the future distribution of 
types. In  addition, the policy implications would be the opposite: a tax
10See Holinstrom [31], Mrrrlees [46],
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in the reputation model reduces the revelation of information and hence is 
inefficient; an income tax  in the matching model, which exactly off-sets the 
rank effect, improves efficiency.
The matching framework w ith  endogenous choice of characteristics (i.e. 
the worker’s ability in  the labour market) has a nice interpretation. Effort 
is viewed as a tool to  gain promotion, i.e. to  get a better job. Two further 
results are shown. First, inequality has an ambiguous effect on the choice of 
effort. Second, a higher rate of turnover increases inefficient effort. All these 
results are matched w ith a number of stylised facts from the empirical effort 
supply literature.
Finally, Chapter 5 m aintains the endogenous choice of characteristics in  a 
labour market environment. The characteristics are productive ability and an 
education technology exists which can augment the ability. The environment 
is not explicitly modelled as a matching model, bu t it has the characteristics 
of positive assortative mating. This is in fact an  assumption, rather th a n  an  
equilibrium outcome. R ather th an  matching, production occurs in  a monop- 
olistically competitive industry. Such an industry generates spillovers by the 
mere size of the industry. As a result, individual investment in  education 
will not take into account the social return. I t  is shown th a t multiple mo­
bility equilibria can exist. Further, sufficient conditions are derived for the 
distribution of types to  exhibit a continuous increase in the spread.
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Part I 
Search
15
Chapter 1 
Bilateral Search and V ertical 
H eterogeneity
This Chapter provides a framework th a t generalises the Perfect Matching 
model into a Imperfect M atching model w ith search frictions. The oentral 
characteristics of the perfect matching model of the marriage market are 
the presence of heterogeneity of types and the bilateral decision: only when 
there is a double coincidence of wants between a male and a female w ith 
heterogeneous preferences will they engage in marriage. Introducing a search 
friction certainly does not decrease the true representation of some markets. 
After all, in a marriage m arket for example, it may not be too  difficult to find 
a spouse, bu t in order to  do as well as possible, some longer (costly) search 
may be optimal. The objective is to  show existence of equilibrium and to  
characterise the equilibrium allocation in  the presence of frictions. W ithout 
frictions, the two-sided Perfect M atching model where agents are vertically 
heterogeneous (i.e. there exists a ranking of the types) has an  allocation th a t 
exhibits positive assortative mating. The highest ranked female is matched 
w ith the highest ranked male, etc. This is due to  the b ilateral nature of
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acceptance. Tlie second highest ranked male would like to  he m atched w ith  
the highest type female, but she will not acoept marriage. She can do be tter 
being matched w ith  the highest type male. W ith  search frictions, the top 
female will accept males over a certain range, since waiting too long is costly.
The m ain contribution of this Chapter is to  show th a t provided the  dis­
tribution of singles is stationary, a (Nash) equilibrium allocation exists and is 
unique. This is true for any specification of the utility function. This result 
is surprising in two respects. First, uniqueness. The strategies of one sex 
are monotonic in the strategies of the other sex, so a continuum of s tra te­
gies would he expected. However, an argument of iterated  elim ination of 
dominated strategies only leaves one strategy to  survive. Second, existence. 
W hatever preferences are assumed, the allocation can always be found using 
the recursive elimination method. This can give rise to  the existenoe of quite 
unexpected matching sets.
Given existence and uniqueness, three additional results are derived. 
First, the distribution of types is endogenously partitioned for preferences 
th a t are multiplicatively separable. This is unexpected since preferences are 
type-dependent, while by definition of endogenous partitioning, strategies 
are not. Second, for some preferences, matching sets are disconnected. This 
implies th a t you are rejected when you propose a m atch w ith  some types, 
even though you are accepted by bo th  higher and lower types. Finally, the 
model is shown to be robust. W ith  frictions disappearing, the  equilibrium 
allocation coincides w ith  the equivalent allocation in perfect matching.
There are substantial differences w ith  parallel results, bo th  in  the existing 
literature and in simultaneously conducted research. A considerable number 
of authors have looked a t th is problem for a specific utility function where 
the utility derived is equal to  the type matched with. The papers by Mc-
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Nam ara and Collins [42], Burdett and Coles [13], and Bloch and Ryder [12] 
all have these specific utiltity  functions. All of them  derive the partitioning 
result since their preferences are a limit case of multiplicative separability. 
The result derived here applies to  a more general class of utility functions. 
The general partitioning result has independently been discovered by Sm ith 
[69]. Smith also looks a t general preferences bu t provides a different proof 
and solution. The m ain novelty of the approach here is the intuitive appeal 
of the proof and its wide applicability to any utility specification. The fact 
th a t the equilibrium is shown to  exist in a strong concept like iterated dom­
inance provides significant behavioural foundations for bo th  the resulting 
equilibrium allocation and the method or algorithm of obtaining it.
This appealing and intuitive method and solution is derived under the 
assumption of a stationary distribution of singles. A similar approach is 
adopted in McNamara and Collins [42], and Bloch and Ryder [12]. Endo- 
genising the distribution in itself does not pose any problem (this is done 
in the Appendix). The problem is to  find a fixed point for the equilibrium 
distribution and this goes a t the expense of the intuitive derivation of the 
equilibrium allocation1. B urdett and Coles [13] show th a t  due to  thick m arket 
externalities, for some param eter values multiple steady state  distributions 
can be supported in  equilibrium. Our contribution is to  show th a t given a 
distribution of singles, the allocation is unique for any preferences.
The generalisation of the perfect m atching model to  the search model is 
very much modelled in the tradition  of the  literature. The m ain aspect how­
ever is th a t bo th  sides of the market search (i.e. there is bilateral search), 
and th a t there exists an ex ante heterogeneity of the  types. In  th is marriage 
model, individuals of one sex will meet potential partners a t random and
1 Smitli [69] provides a proof for a fixed point of the endogenous distribution of singles.
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there are only a limited number of meetings per unit of time. Given perfect 
information, the type of the potential partner is observed upon meeting and 
can be accepted or rejected. If the type is too low, it may pay to  wait until 
a higher type is met. Acoepting, however, only implies th a t a m atch m ate­
rialises provided there is a double coincidence of wants (i.e. the other party 
decides to  accept as well). In  the presence of bilateral search, the  decision 
to form a m atch cannot be enforced unilaterally. The utility derived from a 
m atch is represented by any cardinal utility  function th a t satisfies Vertical 
Heterogeneity. The model considered features Non-Transfer able Utility.
In  this framework, agents will choose strategies to  accept or reject po­
tential partners th a t come along in order to  maximise the value function 
of searching. Entirely counterintuitive, the uniqueness and existence result 
derives from the fact th a t the equilibrium solution can be solved for, using 
an iterated strict dominance argument. The intuition is th a t w ith  Vertical 
Heterogeneity, the top types of bo th  sexes are most desired by all, so they 
can be assured to  be accepted by all types. Hence, they have an  iterated 
strict dominant strategy. Given these strategies, th is argument equally ap­
plies to  the next but top types, etc. In  the presence of search frictions, they 
have to  accept a range of types w ith  positive mass, so th a t a finite number 
of iterations will suffice.
The basic model is presented in Section 1.1. Even though the marriage 
vocabulary prevails most dominantly in  this Chapter, the model is easily 
generalisable to  trading or labour m arket metaphors. In  Section 1.2 , the 
model is solved and it is shown th a t a unique iterated strict dominance equi­
librium exists and th a t for multiplicatively separable utility functions the 
Steady State distributions are endogenously partitioned. Section 1.3 pro­
vides the intuition behind the elimination prooedure and discusses several
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possible equilibrium outcomes in  function of the pay-off specification. The 
equivalence of the model w ith the Gale-Shapley-Becker model is rigorously 
proved in  Section 1.4. Some concluding remarks are m ade in  Section 1.5. The 
Appendix provides a proof for the m ain Proposition and derives the endoge­
nous distribution of singles. It is also shown th a t even w ith  multiplicatively 
separable utility functions, strategies are type dependent out of Steady State 
and th a t the Steady State ’’never arrives” .
1.1 The Basic M odel
Consider two disjoint sets of infinitely lived individuals: females and males. 
They are intrinsically heterogeneous in  type. Only one dimension of het­
erogeneity will be considered, so th a t their type can be represented by one 
variable 9. This type can be interpreted as a measure of either beauty, 
wealth, sexual attraction, etc. or as a composite measure of all those char­
acteristics. Females and males are distinguished by 9j and 9m respectively. 
Both populations of singles are cumulatively distributed according to  Fi(9) 
over 0{ =  [£i5 #{], i E { /, m ]  (with fi{9) the density function) and have equal 
measure one.
Individuals can be in two possible states. They can either be matched to  
a partner or they can be single. W hen single they are looking for a partner to 
be matched to. Partners of a different sex meet randomly, and upon meeting 
they can perfectly observe the type of the other sex. A t th a t moment, they 
will decide whether to acoept or reject a m atch w ith  the partner met. A 
m atch is materialised only when bo th  partners decide to  accept each other. 
The decision is bilateral and cannot be enforced unilaterally.
Being single is a dire state. I t does not yield any intrinsic utility. The
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state of being m atched on the other hand brings all potential pleasure th a t 
exists in this world. I t  is modelled as an  instantaneous utility derived a t 
the moment the m atch is formed, i.e. when bo th  individuals decide to  ac­
cept the m atch the marriage is instantaneously ”consum (m at)ed” . The non- 
transferable utility  to  an  individual of sex i characterised by type 9{ from 
being matched to  a type 9j is Ui(9j, 9{), w ith u continuous and in general no 
symmetry is required Ui 7  ^ Uj. Preferences exhibit Vertical Heterogeneity, 
ilq. >  0. This implies th a t there is a ranking of the types of the other sex 
on which all individuals agree. All men agree th a t Juliette Binoche is the 
most beautiful woman and all women have no doubts about who is the least 
endowed man. Note th a t utility is type dependent w ithout any restrictions. 
Showing an equilibrium exists in  the presence of a general utility specifica­
tion is exactly the objective of this paper. Clearly, utility is cardinal, since 
a search model intrinsically puts a cardinal value on the tim e of search. The 
general utility specification allows for any cardinal value of the  vertically het­
erogeneous preference orderings as long as the values are bounded: u(0i) >  0, 
u(9i) <  oo2.
Typically, in  a search environment it is recognised th a t the  instantaneous 
utility from ” consumption” does not measure the exact satisfaction, sinoe it 
does not take into account the (in) direct cost incurred during search. In  a 
search model w ith  prices, price is no longer a perfect indicator of the value, 
as is the case in  the  neoclassical model. Search models do however use the 
neoclassical tools by collapsing instantaneous utility and search costs into 
Value functions, using some mechanistic representation of a environment w ith  
friction. Here, a constant returns to  matching3 search technology is specified
2Iu what follows, tlie notation u(*) may be nsed to signify Ui(-,6i) wlien tliere is no 
confusion possible.
3 Constant returns to matching implies that the number of meetings in the market is
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as follows. W hen single, an individual bumps into someone of the other sex 
w ith probability (3. This arrival rate (3 is distributed according to  a Poisson 
process. Infinitely lived agents are not matched for life. W ith  probability 
a , a m atch is dissolved4. For the purpose of this chapter, on-the-job search, 
endogenous separation and polygamy are ruled out.
Crucially, not all potential partners met will yield a match. In  the first 
place, an individual may not be entirely satisfied w ith  the type of the other 
sex and will prefer to  search further until a more preferred type is met. 
Second, an individual may be very willing to  enter a match, hu t the potential 
partner may wish to postpone the match. An individual’s strategy will be 
determined subject to  being accepted, so in the first instanoe, a strategy of 
an individual will be determined taking the strategies of all other players 
as given. An equilibrium will then  be a rule such th a t an  agent maximises 
the value function taking into account th a t all other agents adopt such a 
maximising strategy.
An individual’s optimising strategy will be derived from maximising the 
value functions Vq and V\ in bo th  possible state, the value for being single 
and matched respectively. They will in general be different depending on the 
type The value functions of bo th  states are w ritten  in the form of Bellman 
equations which give the current option value, given a positive interest rate 
r.
rVo(9i) =  (3 max Ee. [0, u(9j,9i) -f V1(9i) -  V0{9{) | given acceptance by 9j\
______________________________  ( i . i )
proportional to tlie number of individuals searching. As a result, tlie number of meetings
per person is constant.
4 Modelling finitely lived agents witli an exogenous inflow of new birtlis yields the same
results.
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rVi {9i) =  a[V0(9i) - V i {9i)} (1.2)
Note tlia t being single has a positive option value associated w ith  it even 
though being single does not yield any intrinsic instantaneous utility. The 
reason is of course th a t there exists the probability of being m atched at 
some future point in time. W hen single, a potential partner is m et w ith  
probability /?. The type of the partner is randomly drawn from the pool of 
singles. Provided the type 9j accepts the match, the instantaneous utility 
derived is u(9j, 9i). Marriage will be proposed if being m atched to  9j yields a 
higher utility th an  the value of looking further until a more preferred type is 
met. This is the case when u(9j, 9{) -\-V\{9i) is higher th an  the expected value 
of remaining single Vo(9i). Since separation occurs w ith  fixed probability a , 
the option value of being matched is given by a  times the residual value of 
switching from being matched to  being single.
The decision of an individual of type 9i is either to  accept or reject a 
type 9j th a t is met. We will represent this by the  binary variables fti(9j, #{) 
which is defined as 7Ti(9j,9i) =  1, if a m atch w ith  9j is accepted by 9 and 
7Ti(9j,9i) =  0, if it is rejected. Clearly, acceptance does not necessarily imply 
th a t a m atch materialises, given the bilateral nature of the decision to  form a 
match. A type of the other sex 9j accepts a type 9{ if 7Tj(9  ^9j) =  1. W hether 
a type 9\ is accepted is given by the  inverse function of 7Tj(9i,9j). Hence, 
once any potential trading partner is met, the m atch is materialised w ith  
probability ijji(9i)
^ ( 0 0 =  /  7ri (x,9i)7rj (9i,x)dFj (x) (1.3)
JQj
where Fj{9j) is the cumulative density function of singles in  the market. 
R e m a rk  1 Since the whole population is not single at the same time, the
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measure of people searching is not equal to the measure of the population. 
More importantly, since in general not all types have the same strategy (i.e. 
the strategy is type dependent), the distribution of singles Fi(9i) is not equal 
to the distribution of the entire population, say Hi(9i). In the Appendix, the 
relation between the H  and F  is derived. All our results go through with an 
endogenously derived distribution of singles, both in the steady state and out 
of the steady state.
There are however two reasons why our results are derived under an ex­
ogenously given distribution of singles F. First, we do not have a proof for 
a fixed point of this distribution. Second, there is a source of multiplicity of 
steady state equilibria which is independent of the potential multiplicity this 
paper shows not to exist. Burdett and Coles [13] provide an example where 
separate beliefs about the steady state distribution can be supported in equi­
librium. This multiplicity is due to thick market externalities in the search 
technology, very much as in Diamond [18]. The main contribution of Propo­
sition 1 below is to show that given a distribution of singles (of which more 
than one may exist), there exists a unique equilibrium allocation. Below, it 
will become apparent that that in itself is a most nontrivial result.
Equation (1.1) can now be rew ritten in term s of the binary variables 7t* 
and 7Tj and the distribution of single males and females F(9{] and F(9j).
rVo{Oi) =  [3 [  7Ti(xj 9i)nj(9i, x)[u(x, ft) +  Vi (ft) -  Vo(0i)]dFj(x) (1.1’)
J&j
An individually optimal solution to (1.1’) and (1.2) for a type ft is a strategy 
of acceptance tt; such th a t (s)he is indifferent between remaining single and 
being matched. A n equilibrium requires th a t individuals use a strategy such 
th a t they accept all matches for which the values of being m atched is higher 
than  the value of remaining single. In  w hat follows, th is will be referred to
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as a reservation strategy: a type 9j is offered marriage if u(9j,9i) -fi Vi(9i) — 
Vo(9i) >  0. The reservation strategy implies th a t for each 9{ there must then  
be a critical type 9j =  (j)j(9i) which solves the equation
u f a )  >  Vo(0i) -  V ^ )  (1.5)
R e m a rk  2 The reservation strategy restricts the strategy space since it rules 
out strategies where lower type males choose to reject a high type female 
because they know they will be rejected anyway. That would yield a degenerate 
equilibrium where everyone rejects everyone. Because we impose the strategy 
”accept all types for which the expected value of a match is higher than the 
marginal type”, high types cannot be rejected strategically.
An optim al strategy 7Ti(9j, 9{) will be determined in function of the critical 
type (f)j associated w ith the strategy (1.5). An Imperfect M atching Equilib­
rium can now be defined using the notion of N ash equilibrium. It is a list 
of optimising strategies taking into account th a t all other agents use their 
optimising strategy.
D e fin itio n  1 For given distributions of singles Fi and F j, an Imperfect 
Matching Equilibrium is a list (^i(9j,9i),iTj(9i,9j)), W9i G 0 i, 6 Oj sat­
isfying:
1. Equations (1.1*) and (1.2);
2. The reservation strategy (1.5).
1.2 The Results: Existence and Uniqueness
In  this Section, the m ain result of existence and uniqueness of the Imperfect 
Matching Equilibrium is derived. For th a t purpose, three Lemmas are shown.
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Lemma 1 claims th a t a reservation strategy implies all types 9j above the 
critical type <pj are accepted and all the types below are rejected. Lemma 
2 prooeeds to  prove th a t there is a unique reservation strategy holding the
strategy of all other players constant. Lemma 3 shows th a t the reservation
strategy has an  upper and a lower bound. W ith  these Lemmas, the m ain 
result in Proposition 1 can be shown.
Lemma 1 provides the relation between the strategy 7T; and the reservation 
type pj.
L em m a 1 A reservation strategy iTi(9j,9i) satisfies:
*i(9jA) = L ifOj >
7n(9j ,9i) =  0, tf 9j <  <Pj(9i)-
P ro o f . pj(9{) has to  satisfy the reservation strategy u(pj,9 j)  >  Vo{9i). 
Since ug. >  0 and =  0, the Lemma is always (never) satisfied
for 9j >  (<)p j(9{). I t  follows th a t any 9j >  (<)pj(9 i) will be accepted 
(rejected), so th a t nTi(9j,9i) =  1(=  0). ■
R e m a rk  3 The use of the decision variables ir* may at this stage appear 
cumbersome notation, since from Lemma 1, strategies are monotonic in 9j, 
so that TTj =  1 always constitutes a connected set in 9j. However, not only 
do we need 1Ti(x,9i), but also its inverse tti(9j,x). In general, 7Tj =  1 is not 
a connected set in 9{. As a result, with the decision variables the calcula­
tion of integrals can be made without knowing the internal boundaries of the 
disconnected sets.
Lemma 2 shows th a t, given the strategies of all other players, the reserva­
tion strategy is unique. Using the reservation strategy (1.5) equations (1.1*) 
and (1.2) can be rew ritten
Ti(4>j) =  (r +  a)u(pj) -  py iip j)  =  0 (1.6)
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w ith 7i(0j) =  f&j ~  u {4>j)]dFj(x )- The first-order
condition (1.6) embodies the trade-off made by every individual agent. W ith  
a reservation strategy, all types above the reservation type (pj(9{) are ac­
cepted and a m atch is materialised if you are accepted by these types. Given 
acceptance, Vertical Heterogeneity implies th a t the higher the reservation 
value, the higher the expected value of the match. The cost of increasing 
the reservation value though is th a t the probability of leaving the pool of 
singles decreases: being more choosy means th a t (utilityless) waiting times 
increase. In  the limit, the prinoe(ss) of your dreams arrives w ith  probabil­
ity zero, hence the expected time of being single is infinite and utility is 
zero. Moreover, w ithout a direct search cost, the opportunity cost of waiting 
is utility foregone while you could be matched to  a partner. Solving (1.6) 
yields a critical type (pj(9{), V#*, and hence a reservation strategy 7Ti(#j,#{), 
V#{. Lemma 2 shows it is unique.
Lem m a 2 Given ttj, and for </>'• =  m ax{^ E Q j  \ ^ j { 9 j )  =  1}'
(i) (f)j is the unique solution to Ti((pj) =  0;
(ii) (f)j <  0'..
P ro o f. First, it follows from the definitions of ipi(9i) and 0 ' th a t for (pj >  
(p'j, ipi =  0 and as a result 7* =  0. Since u{9f) >  0, (from uq. >  0 and 
u(9_j) >  0 ), it follows th a t Ti((pj) >  0 for (pj >  0'- and th a t there is no solution 
to Ti((pj) =  0 in  (0j‘,9j ). Next, (T{)(f) =  (r 4- a )«^ — j3^  >  0, V0, E Qj since 
J-f =  ~ u9j {(pj'i 9{) f Qj 7ri(z ,9 i)7ri (9i,x)dFj(x) <  0 and ue. >  0. Given th a t 
Ti((pj) >  0 for (pj >  (pj and th a t (Ti)# >  0, a solution to  Ti((pj) =  0 is in 
[9j,<P'j\- This establishes (ii) (pj <  (p'j.
Since 7] is strictly increasing, the solution is unique. If Ti(9j) <  0, there 
is an interior solution. If u[(pj) >  Vq{9{) — V\(9{) holds w ith  stric t inequahty
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for some 9^ there is no interior solution Ti((pj) =  0. A n optimising agent will 
then  choose the unique (pj as the minimum Bj E @j, satisfying the reservation 
strategy. This maximises the expected value Vq(0») — V\(9{) and the solution 
is a corner solution. This establishes (i) (pj is the unique solution to  Ti((pj) =  
0. ■
The proof of uniqueness of the reservation value is made using the fact 
th a t the value function is monotonic in the reservation value. P a rt (ii) of the 
Lemma shows th a t the reservation value cannot be above the highest type 
th a t is willing to  accept you. O n the other hand, if there is no interior solution 
below th a t, the solution is the corner solution 9j. Together w ith  Lemma 1, 
it then  follows th a t any type above the reservation type is accepted. Like 
a unique optim al response in a normal form game does not imply a unique 
Nash equilibrium, uniqueness of the reservation strategy, given the strategies 
of all other players does not imply equilibrium is unique. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1.1. The lower graph is the reservation strategy of all types 0*: 
above the reservation type, all 9j are accepted, below they are rejected. The 
upper graph is the reservation value for all types 9j\ to  the right of the graph, 
all 9i are accepted, to  the left all are rejected. Clearly, left of 9* not all 9j 
are willing to  acoept a match. Only the types 9j below the upper graph (i.e. 
inverse of the reservation strategy of the types 9j) will accept. The vertical 
distance between the two graphs is then  the range over which matches are 
materialised. Measured over the distribution Fj it determines the probability 
of acceptance ipj.
To establish the nature of an equilibrium, it has to  be determined how 
the strategy of a player changes in  the presence of a change in  the strategies 
of all other players, i.e. a change in  the upper schedule. Intuitively, the 
lower schedule will move upwards in  the presence of an upward schedule of
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Figure 1.1: Reservation Strategies
the upper one. This is shown rigorously in Lemma 3(ii). As a result, many 
equilibria may be envisaged: one unique response for each strategy of the 
other players. However, Lemma 3(i) proves th a t agents accept matches w ith 
strictly positive mass (if not so, they will become matched with probability 
zero). This implies tha t, given the strategies of all other players, there is an 
upper bound to the reservation strategy. P art (iii) then  provides the proof 
that if accepted by some positive mass, there is also a lower bound to the 
reservation strategy.
R em ark  4 For the remainder of the paper, the following notation is used.
• 7tJ (9).) >  tT?(9k), k  6 { i , j }  means that fo r a given 
7 T V 0 / .  and with strict inequality for some k  with positive mass;
• *i(Qk) = K?(dk) i f  for a given 9_k,?r?(03-,0i) =  n? V0*;
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.  (0},0}) <  (91,9}) if at least one of the following two equations holds 
with strict inequality: 6} <  Of or 9} <  9};
.  (010}) =  (919)) if both 9] =  91 and 9} =  9}.
R e m a rk  5 With every value of (pj(9i), there is associated a value 7Vi(9j,9i). 
It follows that the whole schedule (pj(9i), V#* is defined by /iri(9j,9i). In terms 
of notation, 77 =  is the reaction function t* yielding the unique solution
7Ti for a given Wj. That is, for a given iTj, TJ is solved V9 j .
L em m a 3 (i) An optimising agent will always accept matches within a range 
of agents with strictly positive mass;
(ii) 7r}(0j) >  (9j) implies (p} >  (p};
(Hi) nj(9j) >  0 implies there is an upper bound on the reservation value
(pj ■
P ro o f, (i) A population w itli zero mass implies th a t 7* =  0. Since u(9f) >  0, 
Ti((pj) >  0. Ti((pj) =  0 can only be satisfied for some % =  0. This implies 
acoepting a population w ith strictly positive mass. This applies to  all types 
of both  sexes since u(9f) >  0 and u(9{) >  0,
(ii) 7rj(9j)  >  ftj(9j) oeteris paribus implies 7 ? >  7?, by definition of 7*. 
If (p} is the unique solution to  Tj(0] | p j)  =  0, i.e. Ti(cp}) =  0 given 7rj, 
then it follows th a t T{(0j  | tt?) ^  0 , since '1 (p ^  0 . Tlie unique solution, to 
Ti((pj | n}) =  0 then  satisfies (p} >  (p}\
(iii) For tti(9j) >  0, 7* >  0. Sinoe T# >  0, a decreasing (pj implies a 
decreasing T(<pj). As a result, there will exist a value X  satisfying u(X)  >  0 
such th a t T (X )  < 0 .  No agent will choose such a reservation strategy. Hence, 
there is a lower bound X* where T(X*)  =  0. If X* £  0^, X* =  {min^- 6 
0 j  | 0j >  X , T (X )  =  0}. ■
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L em m a 4 For utility functions of both sexes satisfying
(r +  a)udi{4>j) ~(3 [  'Ki{x,ei)nj (ej , x)[udi{x) -  u e X ^ d F ^ x )  =  0 (1.7)
J&j
the equilibrium mapping is type-independent, for a given ttj and Fj.
P ro o f . From Lemma 2, there exists a unique reservation strategy, given the 
strategy of all other players. Type-independence of the reservation strategy 
will occur when, taking ttj as given, =  0 , i.e. when a lower type has the
same reservation value. W ith  >  0, the implicit function theorem implies 
T0i =  0, or equation (1.7). ■
P ro p o s it io n  2 For multiplicatively separable utility functions, the distribu­
tions of types are endogenously partitioned.
P ro o f. Consider the general formulation of a multiplicatively separable 
utility function: u(9j,9i) =  v(9j)w(9i). T (0J) =  0 can be rew ritten as
(r +  a)v(9j) — (3 [  a?)[i;(a?) — v((f>j)]dFj(x) =  0 (1.8)
J&j
It is easily verifiable th a t T0. =  0, provided ftj{9i, 9j) is independent of 9{, i.e. 
7Tj(9*, •) =  'Kj(9?, •), V0? 9f. By requiring th a t Uj is multiplicative, th is is
automatically satisfied \/9{ in the same partition, provided th a t individuals 
have time invariant strategies. ■
1.3 Discussion of the Results
Proposition 2 provides a good example in order to  get some insight into the  al­
gorithm of the iterated elimination of dominated strategies which establishes 
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Using the Steady State equilib­
rium strategies, the partitioning result will be used to  illustrate Proposition
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Figure 1.2: Partitioning
1. Consider Figure 1.2. If all types 9{ are acoepted by all 0j, all $i choose 
the same type-independent reservation value 9*, given a multiplicative utility 
function. From Lemma 3(ii), it follows th a t all reservation strategies above 
this value are dominated and can thus be eliminated. Being accepted by less 
than all the types 9j would certainly lower their reservation value. The same 
holds for all 9j. However, if all 9j have dominated strategies above this upper 
bound, these dominated strategies can be eliminated. It follows th a t all 9{ 
above 9* are accepted by all w ith certainty, so th a t >  9* their reservation 
strategy 9* is dominant given the above eHmination of dominated strategies. 
Likewise, the iterated strict dominanoe strategy for all 9j > 9* is 9*. This 
gives rise to the first set of partitions. Now given the dominant strategies of 
the types in the highest partitions, the same iterated dominance argument 
can be repeated. All 9{ < 9* are now rejected by all 9j > 9*. Provided 
they are accepted by all types below the highest partition, they will choose a
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revised (type-independent) reservation strategy (the second horizontal line). 
Again, the iterated dominance argument implies th a t the second partition  is 
formed by all types th a t are accepted w ith certainty. This goes on until all 
types belong to a partition.
Before the algorithm is extended to  the general case, two remarks. The 
partitioning result is quite surprising. Though utility functions are type- 
dependent, the strategies are not. For a special case of multiplicatively sep­
arable utility functions w ith =  0 , the result is fairly intuitive since the 
utility function is type-independent5. I t  follows th a t the first order condition
(1.6) is type independent. Utility derived and hence the opportunity cost are 
identical ex ante for types w ithin one partition. Hence, they will solve for 
the same solution. W ith  type dependent utility functions th is is equally the 
case but for different reasons. Consider for example the case where higher 
types derive more utility from being matched w ith  a high type of the other 
sex (i.e. the utility exhibits strategic complementarities). I t  follows th a t the 
expected value of being matched is increasing in  type. O n the one hand, 
higher types will be more choosy and have higher reservation values. O n the 
other hand, w ithout direct search costs, the cost of search is the opportunity 
cost of not being matched. As a result, the search cost is increasing in  type. 
The higher types are more impatient and choose lower reservation values. 
For multiplicative utility functions, these two effects cancel out against each 
other and the first-order condition (1.8) is homogeneous of degree zero in  the 
own type.
5Tlie partitioning result, obtained in different frameworks, lias always been derived 
for a special case of tlie type-independent ntility function: Ui =  6j. See McNamara and 
Collins [42], Block and Ryder [12], Burdett and Coles [13]. The exception being Smitk [69] 
wko looks at multiplicative pay-offs and derives a similar result to the one in Proposition
2.
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Note further th a t in case u(9_^ ) =  u(9j) =  0 the num ber of partitions goes 
to infinity. At the bottom  it is always more lucrative to  wait a b it more and 
not accept the lower types since they  yield utility going to  zero. The proof 
is beyond the purpose of this Chapter.
The uniqueness result is independent of both  the specification of the pay­
off function and of the fact whether bo th  sexes have the same pay-off func­
tions. The proof for existenoe and uniqueness uses a generalised iterated 
strict dominance argument as discussed for the case of multiplicatively sep­
arable utility functions. Imagine for example th a t the reservation value is 
increasing in type when acoepted by all other types, as is the case in  Figure 
1.1 above. All strategies above this schedule are dominated. I t  follows th a t 
there exists a pair (#*,6^ ), above which ah types are accepted w ith  certainty. 
Hence, all types above (9*f9j) have a unique iterated strict dominant s tra t­
egy. Taking these dominant strategies as given, all types below will revise 
their upper bound above which all strategies are dominated, so they choose 
a new reservation value below the dashed fine. A new pair (9?, 9 j) exists for 
which there is now a iterated dominant strategy. This can then  be repeated a 
finite number of times. The proof for the case where the reservation schedule 
is decreasing in type needs some additional feature. Consider Figure 1.3. In  
the panel on the left, the case is depicted for reservation schedules decreasing 
in type. This the case for example for utility functions like =  9j -f 0*. The 
dashed line is the (decreasing) reservation value conditional upon acceptance 
by all types of the other sex. All reservation values above this schedule are 
strictly dominated. At the intersection of the two dashed schedules, the pair 
(9*, 9j) is defined. All types above have a dominant strategy, given by the fat 
line and equal to  the dashed fine. The types immediately below (9^,9j) are 
now acoepted by some types above their first reservation schedule, bu t not
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Figure 1.3: Downward Sloping Reservation Strategies
by all. Hence they will revise their upper bound downwards. However, from 
Lemma 3(iii), and given acceptance by some, they now also have a lower 
bound. This holds for both sexes. Given the lower bound of the other sex, 
they will revise their upper bound and given the upper bound of the other 
sex, they will revise the lower bound. This goes infinitely until the unique 
reservation schedule is determined. The panel on the right in Figure 1.3 is 
merely a variation on the same theme. One schedule is upward sloping, the 
other downward. Again, by eliminating dominated strategies starting from 
the top (i.e. above (#*, 9*)), the whole schedule can be constructed uniquely.
R em ark  6 Figure 1.3 clearly illustrates that the slope of the schedule cfj is 
not only a function of the utility function. It can be shown that for util­
ity functions exhibiting log-supermodularity (i.e. U\2u > u^u2)  the reserva­
tion value, given acceptance by all, is increasing in type and decreasing if  
it is log-submodular (see Smith [69]). However, the equilibrium schedule is 
not necessarily downward sloping over the whole range even i f  there is log-
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submodularity but tt, is type independent. This is for example the case at the 
upper part of the distribution. In Figure 1.3, even though in both cases at least 
one of the utility function is log-submodular, at the lower end the schedule is 
upward sloping. The reason is that in that range, ttj is type-dependent.
1.4 Perfect Matching Equivalence
In  this Section, it is shown th a t the equilibrium is indeed the generalisation of 
the Perfect M atching model. First, the perfect m atching model is defined in 
more detail. Second, it is shown th a t the Bilateral Search model w ith Vertical 
Heterogeneity yields the same outcome as the Perfect Matching model when 
the search friction disappears in  the limit. The search friction disappears 
when waiting time goes to zero, i.e. when the arrival rate [3 goes to  infinity.
The Perfect M atching model used as the benchmark here is the model 
by Gale and Shapley [27] and rigorously discussed in  R o th  and Sotomayor 
[62]. Originally it was formulated for a finite number of agents and for any 
set of preferences. Here, it will be extended to  a continuum of agents and 
the preferences will be such th a t they exhibit Vertical Heterogeneity, the 
Beckerian aspect. In  w hat follows, it will be referred to  as the Gale-Shapley- 
Becker model. Consider two disjoint sets of agents 0* and 0 j ,  bo th  w ith  mass 
one. Individuals are characterised by a type 6^ cumulatively distributed over 
Fi{9i). Vertical Heterogeneity of preferences can be represented by any utility 
function u(9j,6i) as long as ue. >  0 . A m atching y  is defined as a one-to- 
one correspondence from 0 ; U Qj onto itself of order two (i.e. y 2(9{) =  9{), 
such th a t y(9i) E Qj and y(9j)  E 0 j. A m atching y  is individually rational 
if it is not blocked by any individual agent. I t  is stable if it is individually 
rational and if it is not blocked by any pair of agents, one female and one
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male. Clearly, th is establishes th a t a stable matching is a core concept and 
thus a cooperative equilibrium. In  Chapter 3 (Corollary 4), it is shown th a t 
there exists a unique stable matching, p(9i) =  9j O  Fi(9{) =  Fj(9j): in  
equilibrium, only individuals of the same rank match.
The Equivalence between Perfect Matching and Search can now be estab­
lished. Note however th a t there is an entirely different use of equilibrium con­
cept: cooperative versus non-cooperative equilibrium. W hat will be shown 
is th a t the non-cooperative search equilibrium yields the same outcome as 
the cooperative stable matching w ithout friction when the search friction is 
infinitely small (i.e. lim/? —» oo). I t  can actually be shown th a t the sta­
ble matching is equivalent to the trem bling hand equilibrium which rules 
out degenerate non-cooperative equilibria. Note also th a t our restriction to  
reservation strategies has a similar impact.
P ro p o s it io n  3 E qu iva len ce . The Gale-Shapley-Becker Perfect Matching 
model is the limit case of the search model when trading opportunities arrive 
instantaneously (i.e. lim/3 —> oo).
P ro o f. For lim/? —> oo, the system of equations (1.1) and (1.2) collapses. 
The state  of being single now coincides w ith  the state  of being m atched since 
a m atch is instantaneously realised. I t follows th a t the value of being single 
has to  equal the expected value of being matched: Vo(9i) — E\V\(9i) | 7Tj =  1]. 
An individual 9{ will choose a reservation value (pj such as to  maximise the 
expected value of being matched subject to  being accepted. This implies
«rt r t a \  I@j > x )u (x )dFA x ) n .
1 ‘ / a . Wi(x, x)dFj(x)
EV\ is monotonically increasing uupj, provided acceptance by se x j:  >
0, s.t. 7Tj =  1 is derived from
[  'Ki{z,9i)'Kj {9j ,x)u(x)dFj (x ) -u ((p j)  [  7ri (x,9i)7rj (9j ,x)dFj (x) (1.10)
J&j
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s.t. 7Tj =  1, which is satisfied since Uq. >  0. The solution to  this problem is a 
corner solution: E \ \  is maximised when (f)j is maximised, s.t. ttj =  1. W ith  
</>'• =  max{^- E Qj \ f^i(9j) =  1}, the optim al choice of (f)j is (f)j(9i) =  ^ -(0»), 
\/9i. Likewise, 4>i(9j) =  <fi'i{9j), V9j-. Applying the algorithm in  the proof of 
Proposition 1 then  gives the following allocation: a type 9i will m atch w ith  
9j if and only if Fi(9i) =  Fj(9j). This is equivalent to  the stable m atching 
A*(0i) =  9j Fi(9i) = Fj(9j).  ■
1.5 C oncluding Remarks
In  this paper, the Perfect Matching model is extended to  an Imperfect Match­
ing Model w ith  search frictions. A search model is proposed featuring vertical 
heterogeneity and bilateral search. Equilibrium in a concept as strong as iter­
ated elimination of dominated strategies is shown to  exist and is unique, irre­
spective of the utility specification of individuals. I t  is derived th a t its limit 
case w ithout friction is the Gale-Shapley-Becker perfect matching model. 
Equilibrium properties can be derived in  function of the pay-off function and 
as a result, for multiplicatively separable utility functions, equilibrium strate­
gies are type-independent even though the utility function does depend on 
the type. I t  follows th a t bo th  distributions of types are endogenously parti­
tioned, segregating the market into classes.
In  other work, it has been shown th a t the Imperfect Matching Model 
for specific utility functions can result in  multiple steady states. This is 
due to  a sorting effect in the distribution of singles which has an  impact on 
the number of singles searching and thus on the matching technology. The 
results here can be taken to generalise th a t result, incorporating the impact 
of search externalities from sorting in  the population. The m ain problem
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w ith a general existence proof of a steady state equilibrium is th a t usual 
techniques do not readily generalise w ith non continuous strategy spaces.
Irrespective of the establishment of the existence of a steady state  equi­
librium, the Imperfect M atching Equilibrium and its properties prepare this 
framework to  be applied to  economically relevant environments. Certainly, 
the labour m arket is a prominent candidate. N ot only is there an equilibrium 
rate of unemployment, there is also an equilibrium rate of idleness of jobs. In  
the Imperfect M atching model, the nature of it can be studied. In  addition, 
in subsequent work (see Chapter 2) it has been established th a t under certain 
conditions, the lowest types of one set will never be matched. The reason for 
th a t is th a t the even the lowest types of the other set prefer to  search longer, 
rather than  accepting a m atch w ith  a low type. In  the labour market, the 
implication is th a t there is a threshold level of skills or ability below which 
there are no jobs available. In  addition to  voluntary unemployment, most 
commonly explained in the search literature, this gives rise to  the existence 
of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
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1.6 Appendix
P ro p o s it io n  1.
P ro o f . Iterated elimination implies n  iterations. Therefore, the following 
notation is introduced. F irst, because of the argument of iterated elimina­
tion, the variable fj,i(9j,9i) =  7Tj(9i, 9j) is introduced in  order to  distinguish 
the acceptance rule by others from the strategy by other players. Clearly, 
in equilibrium they are the same. Ui(9j,9i’,n)  =  II;(rz), Vi, j  is the schedule 
7Xi(9j,9i) calculated in iteration n, provided (ii =  1. 4>j{9i\n) is the reserva­
tion value associated w ith !!;(#.;, 0;;7z), provided /i; =  1. Likewise, ^;(rz) is 
fii(9j,9i), VzJ(7 in iteration n.
In  each iteration tz, the algorithm below will allow to  determine the unique 
strategies for a connected set w ith  positive mass. Given the outcome of 
the anterior iterations th a t all types (#;,#j) >  (9*(n — l ) ,9 j (n  — 1)) have 
determined their unique strategy, the ?vth iteration starts. I t  consists of 5 
steps (below). I t  can be established th a t there exists a set of dominated 
strategies (i.e. there is a maximum reservation value) for all remaining types 
of bo th  sexes. These are determined in step 1-3. These dominated strategies 
imply th a t all types of the other sex higher th an  the reservation value will 
never be rejected. In  step 4, the connected set of all types is determined who 
will never be rejected irrespective of other players’ strategies, which is the 
result of the other sex’s dominated strategies. I t  follows th a t all these types 
have a unique strategy (step 5) which is the result of iterated elimination of 
dominated strategies w ithin this iteration. If the connected set is empty, the 
unique strategy for a strictly positive connected set is determined according
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to Lemma 5. As a result, after the 7i- th  iteration, all (#*, 
have a unique iterated strict dominant strategy.
1. After n — 1 iterations the schedules IL (n — 1) and Hj(n — 1) are
uniquely determined for all (9i,9j) >  (9*(n—l) ,9 j (n  — l)) .  I t  follows th a t in
the next iteration the schedules fa(n) and fa(n) are uniquely defined in th a t 
range. For the other types, maximal acceptance (i.e. fJ>(n) =  1) allows us to  
determine the dominated strategies. Hence, determine fa(n) =  U j ( n — 1), 
if 9j >  9j(n — 1); fa{n) =  1, otherwise. Likewise fa(n) =  — 1), if
9i >  9*(n— 1); fa(n) =  1, otherwise. A t the s ta rt of the procedure (n =  1), 
fa(n) =  1, and fa{n ) =  1, V0*;
2. n i(n )  =  Ti(fii(n)) and Uj{n) =  Tj{fa{n))
3. Consider all types (9^9j) < {9 \{n— l ) ,9 j ( n — 1)). Taking into account 
the unique strategies of all higher types and by determining fa(n) and fa(n) 
in term s of maximal acceptance (i.e. from step 1, there exists no fa >  fa(n), 
it follows from Lemma 2 th a t all reservation strategies 9j >  4>j{9i\ n) are 
strictly dominated for all 9{. From Lemma 1, H{(?i) =  1 for all 
Likewise, all reservation strategies 9i >  <pi (9j; n) are strictly dominated for 
all 9j and n , (n) =  1 for all 9i >  4>i(9j\ n)\
4. Define
(9t(n),0Uu)) =
(min^i,min$j) [ nj(re)II,(re) =  1 and 
V0j < e*i{n -  1): H^n) =  1, Vfy < 0^(n -  1) 
< 0}(n -  1) : Il^n) =  1, V0{ < 0?(n -  1)
(A l.l)
In  the first round (n  =  1), define #*(0) =  9{ and 9j(0) — 9j. Note th a t 
it follows from equation (A l.l)  th a t [9l(ri),9*(n — 1)] and [9j(n),9j(n  — 1)] 
are connected sets. If (9*(n),9j(n)) < (9*(n — l ) , 9 j ( n  — 1)) a t least one of 
these sets is non empty. The unique iterated strict dominant strategies are 
determined in step 5. Alternatively, if (9^(n),9j(n)) = (9l(n — l ) , 9 j ( n  — 1 ) )
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the sets are empty and the pair (9*(n),9*(n)) and the unique iterated strict 
dominant strategies are determined according to Lemma 5 below.
5. From step 3 and from equation (A l.l) , all types E [ 9 l ( n ) , 9 * ( n  — 1)] 
and 9 j  E [ 9 j ( n ) , 9 * ( n — 1)] have f i i ( n )  =  fJ*j(n) =  1 independently of any other 
players strategy (because the strategies are dominated), sinoe fii =  Uj and 
jjij =  ]!{. The reservation strategy of all these types is thus independent of 
the strategy of any other player. By eliminating the dominated strategies, all 
these types have a unique iterated strict dominant strategy and U j  ( n )
respectively (from Lemma 2(i));
This iterative procedure is repeated until Ui(N) =  IIi(./V+l) and Uj(N ) =  
H j(N  -f 1). Because (9*(n), 9j(n)) <  (9*(n — l) ,0 ? (n  — 1)) and from Lemma 
3(i), every agent chooses to  accept matches from a population w ith  strictly 
positive mass. As a result, the populations eliminating strictly dominated 
strategies in every iteration have strictly positive mass. I t  follows th a t 
the equilibrium list (U i(N ),U j(N ))  is obtained after a finite number of N  
iterations. ■
L em m a 5 If according to equation (A l . l )  (9t(n),9j(n)) =  (9 l(n—\),9*j(ri— 
1)) a new pair can be defined such that (9^(n),9j(n)) <  (9^(n—l ) , 9 j ( n —l))  
and such that there exists a unique iterated strict dominant strategy for all 
types in the interval ([9*(n),9*(n — 1)], \9j(n),9j(n — 1)]).
P ro o f. First, (9*(ri),9j(n)) =  (9*(n—l) ,9 j ( n —l))  implies th a t bo th /i{ (n) >  
0 for 9j >  (j)j(n— 1) and fJ>j(n) >  0 for 9i >  (f>i(n— 1). This follows from Lemma 
3(i) and (ii). If it is not satisfied say for sex z, there would exist a range of 
dominated strategies w ith strictly positive mass below 0 j  for the types of sex 
i. Hence, the connected set would be non-empty and the equality no longer
43
holds. Therefore, the pair can be redefined such th a t the set is non-empty
\
(a>! \ mt \\ I I M n) ^  0. >  4>An -  !)}>
m in ^ -  | fJ>j{n) >  0, V19* >  1)} j
(A1.2)
The proof now is similar in spirit to  the proof of dominance solvability of 
the Cournot model in Gabay and Moulin [26] and Moulin [51] and involves 
a Cournot-tatonnem ent process. F irst, additional notation is introduced for 
this stage of the elimination process only. IIj(s | n) is the sub iteration s which 
determines the schedule IIi(n). Elimination of strictly dominated strategies 
will occur by defining an upper bound and a lower bound in  every subiteration 
s: 11“ («s | n) and n j(s  | n). /x“ («s \ n) and fjL\(s \ n) are analogously defined. 
Likewise for individuals of type j .  From Lemma 3(iii) and given [ii(n) >  0 a 
lower bound on the reservation strategy exists. Given ^ ( 1  | n) =  — 1)
if 9j >  9j(n  — 1) and /4(1 | n) =  0 otherwise, II* (1 | n) =  | n)).
All strategies 7T{ >  n{ (i I n) are strictly dominated. Likewise for II*-(1 | n). 
O n the other hand, from Lemma 2, it can be established th a t for upper 
bounds 11“ (1 | n) =  Ti(II*(l | n)) and 11“ (1 | n) =  Tj(11 (^1 | 77.)) all strategies 
* i <  n ? ( i  | n) and ttj <  n ) ( i  I n) are strictly dominated. In  every following 
iteration, II\(s | n) =  Ti(II“ (.s — 1 | 77,)) and II*-(s | n) =  — 1 | 72-)) are
determined. From Lemma 3(iii), all strategies iT{ >  n*(s | n) and iTj >  II*-(s | 
n ) are strictly dominated. Likewise, all strategies tt* <  n r  (s I n) =  ^(D* (a I 
n)) and ttj <  11“ (s \ n) =  Tj(II*(s \ n)) are strictly dominated. If this 
procedure is repeated ad infinitum, II* (oo | n) and 11“ (oo | n) will converge 
to Ili(rz) and II*- (oo | n) and 11“ (oo | n) to  Il^ra): 1. II* (oo | n) >  Ili(n) 
and 11“ (oo | n) <  Il^ra); 2. II* (oo | n) =  Ti(IIJ(oo | n)) =  r^T ^II^o o  | n))), 
which is possible only if II* (oo \ n) =  Ili(n); 3. Similarly for II*- (oo | n) =  
(n). The same reasoning holds for 11“ (oo | n) =  Hi (rz) and 11“ (oo | n) =
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There is a unique strategy Ili(n) and II j(n) for all types 9± G [9*(n),9*(n— 
1)] and 9j G [9j(n),9j(n — 1)]. Hence, the pair (#?(n),#J(n,)) is defined as in  
(A1.2). ■
E n d o g en o u s  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  S ingles
Let Hi(9i) be the distribution of the entire population of sex i and Hf(9{) 
the distribution of singles. All these distributions can be tim e variant. If 
rii is the fraction of singles of type 9{ a t a particular moment in  time, the 
density function hs{9i) of singles associated w ith  the population density h(9{) 
is given by
*'<*■> -  ( 1 - 4 )
At any moment in time, the law of m otion is given by hi =  +  a ( l  — rii).
Clearly, out of the steady state, the distribution of singles hs changes over 
time. Clearly, in a steady state  F  =  H£. This is also true out of steady state  
if players do not hold rational expectations and believe the observed distri­
bution will not change over tim e6. If agents hold full rational expectations, 
they will take into account the change in  the distribution over the expected 
duration (Z^ ) -1 of being single. The belief about the distribution of singles 
then satisfies F(9{) =  H^{9i)dt.
Endogenising the distribution of singles leaves the existence and unique­
ness of the allocation in ta c t (though there is a new souroe of multiplicity). 
In  addition, the characterisation of equilibria for given preferences and the 
perfect matching equivalence still hold. There is however a strong implica­
tion for the off the steady state  characterisation of the partitioning result. 
This is shown below.
6Tliis corresponds to wliat is called a Partial Rational Expectations belief in Burdett 
and Coles [13]
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N o n  S te a d y  S ta te  T y p e  D e p en d e n ce
In  Section Three, it was shown th a t provided the distribution of types is 
time stationary, there is endogenous partitioning of the distribution of types. 
Highly appealing as th is may seem, the result fails to  hold out of steady 
state: reservation strategies are type dependent. This implies th a t even a 
steady state  equilibrium can only be shown to exist if the out of steady state  
equilibrium exists. Since our general Proposition of existenoe of equilibrium 
out of steady state is shown w ith and w ithout type dependence, it follows 
th a t the steady state partitioning result can come about from any initial 
condition. All the other work so far (Smith [69], Burdett and Coles [13]) could 
only conjecture th a t the steady state would come about. However, a proof 
for the case of type-dependent strategies as in Proposition 1 is necessary.
In Proposition 4, it is shown by example th a t out of Steady State, there is 
no partitioning even w ith  multiplicatively separable utility functions. Con­
sider a school ballroom matching m arket where dance starts  a t 8pm after the 
opening dance by the Headmaster and goes on forever. Matches go on for 
one song and hence dissolve after a -1 tim e on average. A t the initial condi­
tion t  =  0 (i.e. 8pm), no one is matched. Suppose a symmetric context w ith  
uniform distributions of types and (multiplicatively separable) utility func­
tions Ui =  9j, which in the unique Steady State endogenously partitions bo th  
distributions. The Steady State distribution of singles H?  is not identical to  
the original distribution of the entire population, all of which are single a t 
t  =  0: Hq =  H. The distribution of singles is different from the distribution 
of the population because between partitions there are different probabili­
ties of entering a match. In  effect, Burdett and Coles [13] show th a t ffj. is 
stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution H. In  addition, out 
of Steady State, the distribution of singles H% will change continuously over
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time 0 <  t  <  T. By the same argument, all distributions a t any later date 
are stochastically dominated by the earlier ones. The R ational Expectations7 
strategy of all types a t t  is calculated given Ft =  f t +^ 1^ H^dt, which is 
stochastically dominated by any F  at an  earlier time. By counter example, 
it is now shown th a t the out-of-Steady-State strategies are type dependent.
P ro p o s it io n  4 Out of Steady State, equilibrium strategies do not endoge­
nously partition the distributions of types, even with multiplicatively separable 
utility functions.
P ro o f. Consider the highest types. At t  =  0, their reservation strategy is 0o, 
calculated taking into account Fq. All types 9 >  (f>q have the same reservation 
strategy. In  the steady state  a t t  =  T, all top types have reservation strategy 
0 t-  Given stochastic dominanoe of by the uniform distribution H,  it 
follows th a t 4>t <  <fo'- the density of singles is lower for higher types in the 
Steady State th an  at the initial condition, so they have to  be less choosy in 
the Steady State (from (1.6)). By the same argument, a t any moment in time 
[ o , n  (fit, V# >  0o is lower th an  any earlier reservation strategy of the 
higher types. I t follows th a t people entering a t different times have different 
strategies. All types of the other sex have, provided they are accepted by 
everyone, a time dependent strategy. This implies th a t acceptance depends 
on the time of entry. A t time t  some one who entered a t tim e t* <  t  will 
acoept all 9 >  (ft*. Since this applies to  bo th  sexes, a type 9{ E [0t? 0o]> faces 
acceptance 77j  =  1, provided the type of the other sex 9j entered at t* such 
th a t 9j <  0 t* ; 77j =  0, if entry was at t* such th a t 9j > (ft*. Sinoe some of 
the high types who entered early will reject a match, the reservation strategy
7Tliis result liolds for any other expectations formations, including Partial Rational 
Expectations (see Burdett and Coles [13]) i.e. Ft = Hf, as long as strategies are time 
stationary.
47
cf)t of all 9 E [0r>0o] will be lower than 0* of all 9 > (j)0. Moreover, since 
the reservation strategy 4>t of the highest types is decreasing over time, the 
number of types th a t reject a type 9{ (ttj =  0) will be dependent on the type 
9l. There are more 9j > (ftt* who entered at t* who reject the lower the type 
9{. This implies th a t the strategy V# E [0t, 0o] at time t  is type dependent 
and increasing in type. ■
The intuition of this result is illustrated in Figure 1.4 and goes as follows. 
Facing the original distribution of all singles, there is a partition a t t  =  0:
0 i
Figure 1.4: No Partitioning out off Steady State
all types above 0o have a type independent strategy 0o, which is smaller 
than  at t  =  T. However, at any time £, the new entrants in the pool of 
singles, will have a strategy (f)0 < (f)t < (pT. All types of the other sex, 
9 E [4>ti fit] are now no longer accepted by the new entrants. They are 
still accepted though by the ones tha t haven’t  been matched yet. As a 
result, they will have a strategy <p(9) < (f>t{9). Since change is continuous
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and the set of individuals no longer lucky to  be in the top partition grows 
monotonically (with monotonically changing distributions), strategies in  the 
range 9 E 0o] are type dependent. In  Figure 1.4, the full th in  line a t (fio is 
the partition  a t t  =  0. The full th in  line a t (j)T is the Steady State Partition. 
The thick line gives the reservation strategies a t some tim e t  E [0, T]. A t the 
top there is still a partition, since the top types are always accepted by all 
and thus have a type independent strategy. I t is smaller th an  the partition  
at time T, because they take into account some of the top types who still 
have a strategy th a t dates from before time t : they have not been m atched 
yet and will be more choosy. They will leave the pool of singles less quickly 
so th a t the top types can be more choosy in expected terms, since more top 
types search on average compared to  the Steady State. Below th a t partition, 
the strategy is affected by the fact th a t the new entrants already have a 
reservation strategy of accepting you. The closer to  (fio, the more of the other 
sex th a t have adopted this strategy, so your reservation strategy is higher 
th an  the lower types in [0 t5 0o]. Hence the type dependence.
Basically, the type dependence follows from the fact th a t a transition  
pa th  changes gradually over time. W ith  the search friction and ex-ante 
strategies (i.e. strategies are determined upon entry and rem ain constant 
until matched), strategies for similar types are different a t different times. 
The following Corollary to the Proposition 4 shows th a t type dependence is 
relevant since, starting  from an out-of-Steady-State the  Steady State ’’never 
arrives” .
C o ro lla ry  1 If the initial condition is out of Steady State, the Steady State 
only arrives after infinite time.
P ro o f . Since meetings are stochastic, w ithin finite time there will always 
be a positive mass of individuals who ex-post have not realised their ex-ante
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strategy. As a result, tliey will keep playing their ex-ante out of Steady State 
strategy. The distribution of singles H* will differ from the Steady State 
distribution H£> as long as t  <  T  =  oo. ■
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Chapter 2 
Some Applications
In  this Chapter, the framework from Chapter I is used to  discuss some par­
ticular results th a t follow from and are specific to  the imperfect matching 
framework. The first Section shows th a t bachelors can exist. Bachelors are 
the lowest types of one of the two distributions who cannot find a match. 
This result is surprising sinoe they exist even though the masses of bo th  sexes 
are equal. In  perfect matching models it is shown (Becker [7]) th a t no one 
remains unmatched if bo th  masses are equal. The second Section deals w ith  
the possibility (in the case of pairwise matching from one distribution) of 
some types rejecting their equals. I t  provides a rationale for why you don’t  
want to  be a member of a club th a t wants you as a member. Again, this is 
counter-intuitive in a model w ith preferences increasing in  types. Rejecting 
one’s own type then  asks the question who will accept yourself in response 
to a similar strategy of your equal counterparts.
Both results highlight some particular feature of the imperfect matching 
model. The difference between the two lies in the underlying assumption 
whether the pairwise matching is between types drawn from two disjoint 
sets or from one joint set. Clearly, bachelors cannot exist in  a model w ith
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matched types drawn from one set: there always exists an equal w ith  whom 
a m atch would generate strictly positive utility. Similarly, w ith  matching 
from disjoint sets, it is impossible to  reject equals.
In  dealing w ith  bo th  issues, some interesting comparative statics features 
th a t affect the equilibrium allocation will emerge. In  this search framework, 
relative preferences of bo th  sets of types are crucial. This is also related 
to the distribution functions of the singles. The equilibrium allocation is 
affected by bo th  a change in the mean of the distribution and a m ean pre­
serving spread. The model can perform well in  explaining macroeconomic 
fluctuations and the effect on the labour market. A downturn can be in­
terpreted as a downward shift in the m ean of the distribution of jobs (i.e. 
the technology). Its effect would be a relative increase in the reservation 
strategies of firms. The effect is a decrease in the reservation strategy of the 
workers and would affect the existence of bachelors (which can be interpreted 
as involuntary unemployment in a job search context) by an  increase in  the 
set of unmatched types. These comparative statics results however are not 
derived rigorously in this Chapter.
For the remainder of this Chapter, the notation from the first C hapter is 
used, unless mentioned otherwise.
2.1 Bachelors
In  a matching model, Bachelors will be referred to  as individuals who are 
never able to  engage in a match, even though they want to. I t  is entirely 
involuntary. This phenomenon is certainly distinct from individuals who 
have been proposed marriage but who choose to  reject the offer because it 
pays in expected term s to  wait for a better opportunity. This situation of not
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engaging in  a m atch is voluntary. Our definition of Bachelors here is related 
to  the bilateral nature of the matches. A n individual would like to  engage 
in a match, but is not acoepted by any type of the other sex. Bachelors can 
then  be defined as:
D e fin itio n  2 Given the equilibrium (tt*,ttj), let 9 f  =  min{4>j{9i),V9i} and 
let Bj =  [9j, 9 f ) .  Bachelors are all those lowest ranked types of the distribu­
tion who never find a match: 9j E Bj, provided 9 f  >  9{.
The existence of bachelors in itself is not surprising in  the case of pop­
ulations of different masses. In  the perfect matching model w ithout search 
frictions for example, Becker [7] remarks th a t the lowest ranked individu­
als of the distribution w ith the largest population are never matched. By 
construction, the perfect matching model only allows for pairwise matching 
from disjoint sets so th a t the maximum number of matches is equal to  the 
minimum of the masses of bo th  populations. O n the other hand, it is also 
shown th a t in the case of zero outside options, all individuals are m atched 
when bo th  populations have equal mass.
The result th a t will be shown below is in  sharp contrast w ith  the perfect 
matching equilibrium allocation. Even though the utility derived from not 
being matched is zero and even though the masses of bo th  populations are 
equal, some individuals will never be matched. This is not because we relax 
the assumption of pairwise matching. The number of individuals m atched of 
both  sexes has to  be equal in all cases. The surprising result is derived from 
the time dimension in this search model. Before th is is expanded upon, an  
example is developed th a t should help make the  mechanics clearer.
The result in Proposition 5 below on the existenoe of Bachelors relies on 
an asymmetry. This will be exploited in  the example.
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E x a m p le  1 Consider a model with the following parameters and functional 
forms: F  ~  £7(0,1]; r + a  =  (3 =  1;u i =  6j-\-Ci. Note that from Proposition 2 
(Chapter 1) an equilibrium will exhibit partitioning, since the utility function 
is multiplicatively separable. There is an asymmetry such that both sides of 
the market only differ in the constant Ci: C j =  0, Cm >  The best response 
condition (1.6) given acceptance satisfies:
4>j 4* 20jf — 1 4- 2C{ =  0
WithCf =  0; 4>m{9f) — \ /2 —1, and(pf(9m) <  0, providedCm >  \ .  It is easily 
verifiable from Proposition 1 (Chapter 1) that the equilibrium reservation 
strategies satisfy (this is illustrated in figure 2.1):
4>rn{Bf ) =  y/2 - 1  ,V 9f
<t>f {9m) =  0 , V 9 m
The implication of these equilibrium strategies is however that V9m E 
Bm =  [0, y/2 — 1] never get matched and are eternal bachelors.
The general conditions are now derived.
P ro p o s it io n  5 Given the equilibrium (7T{, ttj), a Bachelors 9j E Bj exists in 
the set Qj iff
Tj (0i) > o , y d j € B j ,y e i 
2 5 & ) <  0 ,W i
P ro o f. From the definition of Bj,  it follows th a t fKi {9i,9j E Bj) =  0. The 
necessary and sufficient condition is shown in two steps. First, it is shown 
th a t violating condition ( 2 .1 )  for a 9j implies there exists 7T{ =  1 . Suppose 
Tj(9i) <  0, then  from equation (1.6) in Chapter 1, 7  ^ >  0. This can only be 
the case if there exists a tt; =  1 . Hence 9j is no Bachelor. Second, it is shown
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Figure 2.1: Bachelors
that if there are no bachelors, then equation (2.1) does not hold. If there 
are not bachelors Bj, then all 9j are accepted by some 9{, including 9_j- As 
a result, there must exist a 9{ th a t has Ti(9j) >  0 , thus violating condition 
(2 .1). ■
C o ro lla ry  2  Bachelors can at most exist in one of the two disjoint sets.
P ro o f. It is easily verified th a t condition (2.1) in Proposition 5 cannot 
simultaneously hold for both 9j and 93. ■
Turning back to the example, it can be verified th a t the conditions in 
Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 are satisfied. Equation (1.6) in Chapter 1 for 
both sexes satisfies: Tm(9f ) =  9f  4 - Cm — 7 /  and Tf (9m) =  9m — 7 m. The
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implication of being Bachelor is th a t V#m E B m : Try =  0. Hence 7/  =  0. I t  is 
trivial now th a t Tm(0f) =  9f  +  >  0, V#m E Bm. For all females, it holds
th a t Tf(9m) =  —1 <  0.
As was mentioned above, the explanation for the surprising result th a t 
even w ith equal populations and pairwise matching some individuals are 
involuntarily unmatched lies in the duration of search. In  the case of the 
example, males accept a m atch instantaneously, whatever the type of the 
female. Females on the other hand don’t. They all prefer to  reject 41% of 
all the potential partners and wait for a better opportunity to  come. As a 
result, only 59% of all single females per unit of time engage in a match. If 
all males were always accepted, 100% of all singles would engage in a match. 
But it is exactly the pairwise matching restriction th a t prevents this from 
happening. As a result, exactly the same proportion of males is accepted. 
The remaining ones, even though willing to  get matched, are rejected. The 
rationale then  is th a t because of the longer search by the females, the lowest 
ranked males never get matched because they have to  compensate for the 
males being too eager.
The underlying reason for th is asymmetry in search strategy between 
males and females derives from the asymmetric utility derived from a match. 
Males derive a higher utility (9j+Cm) from each m atch th an  females (Cf  =  0). 
As a result, the opportunity cost per unit time of not being matched is higher 
for males, so they are more impatient. This implies they choose a lower 
reservation strategy. Here th is means they are willing to  accept any female 
irrespective of the type. This is not the case for the females who, knowing 
they are acoepted by all males, prefer to  wait until a higher type arrives if a 
low type is met.
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This asymmetry only stresses the importance of the relative param eters 
on the ecpiilibrium allocation. Though beyond the scope of this Chapter, it is 
evident from the example th a t the utility specification will be of fundam ental 
importance. In  addition though, it should be noted th a t the distribution of 
singles is crucial in  two respects. First, the m ean of the distribution. The 
example could equivalently be specified w ith  identical preferences for males 
and females but w ith the distribution of females having a higher mean. The 
interpretation is th a t the ’’higher quality” sex will, other things equal, never 
have Bachelors. Second, the spread will m atter. Observation of equation
(1.6) shows th a t a higher spread will shift the reservation strategy. W hether 
it increases or decreases depends on whether the types matched w ith  are 
above or below the mean. The likelihood of Bachelors occurring increases 
w ith an increasing spread of the opposite distribution.
2.2 One Reason W hy You D on’t Want to Be 
a Member of a Club that Wants You as 
a Member
W hereas the first Section of th is Chapter entirely relies on the assum ption 
of pairwise matching from two disjoint sets, here we consider pairs drawn 
from the same distribution. A first implication is th a t Bachelors can never 
exist (from Corollary 2), unless the population is countable and has an  odd 
number. Several economic interpretations of pairwise matching from one 
set of types have been proposed. Kremer [34] for example considers the 
perfect matching model w ithout search frictions. Workers, heterogeneous 
in their skill level need to  work in  pairs in order to  produce. They are
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necessarily drawn from one distribution. But in addition, there are a number 
of applications in  any context where partnerships are formed of equal types. 
Any type of contest or competition, but also all clubs where membership 
consists of individuals drawn from one set. Here, we will concentrate on the 
endogenous formation of clubs in  the imperfect m atching m odel
Consider a group of tennis players. They are all indexed by a type 9. 
The distribution of singles is F(9). As in Chapter 1, they are looking for a 
potential sparring partner. Partners are met a t an  exogenous arrival rate. 
Preferences are such th a t all players always prefer to  play w ith  a higher 
ranked player th a n  w ith  a lower ranked player. The intuition why some 
players are not proposed a game when they are met is th a t in expected term s 
it pays to  wait for a better match. I t follows th a t players are voluntarily 
inactive. Even though th a t is costly, it is less costly th an  engaging in a 
game w ith too bad a player. However, because of the search friction and 
the opportunity cost of not being matched, players will never wait until the 
” perfect m atch” arrives. As a result, there will be a range of types w ith  
positive mass th a t is accepted.
The result th a t is pu t forward in th is Section highlights the possibility 
th a t a player of a certain type 9 may choose not to  accept a m atch w ith  
someone of her own type. Given symmetry, bo th  will not make an  offer. This 
explains the statem ent: ”one reason why you don’t  want to  be a member of 
a club th a t wants you as a member” . Since you reject your own type, you 
would reject to  be matched w ith  a clone of yourself. Still, you are accepted 
by some other types, so you can be a member of the dub.
All the results from the first chapter apply, since this can in fact be con­
sidered as a special case where F{ =  Fj =  F. Existence and uniqueness then  
follow from Proposition 1 (Chapter 1). Graphically, there will be complete
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symmetry over the 45 degree line: acceptance regions are the exact mirror 
image of the reservation strategies. The interest for th is Section is exactly 
in the interpretation of the standard result when reservation strategies are 
decreasing in type. The next example illustrates the phenomenon.
E x am p le  2 Consider an economy with one set of heterogeneous types 9 dis­
tributed according to F  ~  £ /(0 ,1] and r  4- a  =  /3 =  1. The preferences 
are additively separable u =  ^partner +  @own- For any type 9, the first order 
condition (1.6), Chapter 1, that solves for a reservation strategy <fi, given 
acceptance by all other types, becomes
<$? +  20 -  1 +  29 =  0
Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that the reservation strategy 
is downward sloping:
1 
99 ~  tf> +  l <
This reservation strategy is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Note that with matching 
from one distribution, the picture is entirely symmetric around the 45-degree 
line. For all 9 >  0.5, the reservation type is below the lowest type. For 
9 <  0.5, it is strictly above the lowest type: (j> >  0. The reservation strategy 
locus hits the 45-degree line (i.e. 9 =  <f>) at 9 =  y/h — 2 «  0.24. With 
decreasing reservation strategies, all types in the range 9 E (0,0.24) reject 
a match with someone of their own type. It can easily be verified that the 
black solid line is the equilibrium schedule. Note that in equilibrium, not only 
do the lowest types reject types of their equals, but because of the downward 
sloping reservation schedule, they get accepted by less than they would prefer 
given acceptance by all.
The intuition behind this result relies on the fact th a t reservation strate­
gies given acceptance by all are downward sloping. This follows from a utility
0.5
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Figure 2.2: Rejection of Matches w ith Equals
function like the additively separable function in the example. W ith accep­
tance by all, higher types accept lower types than  the lower types do. This 
is the result of the higher types being more impatient. Their impatience 
derives from the fact tha t w ith these preferences, higher types have a higher 
opportunity cost of not being matched. A high type in expected terms loses 
utility of 9 per unit of time, which is higher than  for a low type. In  order 
to reduoe the loss of not being matched, the high type will be prepared to 
engage in a m atch with a lower type since th a t minimises the time in search.
In the context of pairwise matching from one distribution, a downward 
sloping reservation strategy can result in types rejecting their equals. They 
can do so because with higher types being more impatient, they know th a t 
they will he accepted by the most desired types. This may well be in the 
spirit of what Groucho Marx had in mind: everyone wants to be in a club 
with better members than  herself. W ithout any external effect this is im­
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possible. O n the other hand and in order for a club to  exist, some external 
effect needs to  be present. In  this example, impatienoe drives individuals to  
accept partners of differing type. W ith  some high types having a different 
reservation strategy, the low types can afford not to  let their equals be a 
member of the club.
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Part II 
Perfect M atching
62
Chapter 3
Uniqueness and N egative  
A ssortative M ating in  
Two-Sided M atching
In  tlie two-sided matching literature, a large number of results have been 
shown on the existence of equilibrium. Typically, these are derived for general 
preferences, i.e. there is no restriction on the preferences of agents. The 
contribution in th is Chapter is to extend this literature1 by deriving a set of 
preferences for which the existing equilibrium is unique. This is useful for 
two reasons. First, understanding of uniqueness is desirable when models 
are used as a tool for representing economic environments2. Second, it tu rns 
out th a t the preferences for which the equilibrium is unique are of appealing 
economic relevance: the set is broad and it contains a number of preferences
^ or an overview, see Rotli and Sotomayor [62].
2 A substantial part of tlie non-cooperative game tlieory has been devoted precisely to  
deriving uniqueness results. Milgrom and Roberts [45] even provide a method to  extend 
uniqueness results from one model to another one with a suitable transformation of the 
strategy spaces.
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th a t are commonly assumed.
The m ain result contains two of the preference orderings th a t are often 
used in  matching and related models. First, vertical heterogeneity. The 
search model in P art I exhibits vertical heterogeneity: all agents have an 
identical ranking (i.e. there is unanimity) of the types of the other sex. As is 
apparent from the discussion there, quite a few pieces of related work have 
independently assumed those preferences3. In  addition, the non-cooperative 
game theoretic literature th a t applies lattice theory very often makes use 
of preferences satisfying vertical heterogeneity. Second, horizontal hetero­
geneity. No two agents have identical preferences but there is a strongly 
systematic p a tte rn  which can best be understood in  term s of ’’nearness” . In­
dividuals are indexed by a type on the circle. The nearer a type of the other 
sex, the more she is preferred. This is used amongst others in  the money 
search models by Kiyotaki and Wright [33].
W hat is shown in the main Proposition is th a t the general set of pref­
erences th a t yield uniqueness is in fact the set of convex combinations of 
vertical and horizontal heterogeneity. This general result shows some resem­
blance w ith  the notion of single peakedness, even though it is not identical 
(the preferences of the two sides are over a different domain, i.e. the types 
of the other side, and there has to  be some correspondence between the two 
orderings).
The uniqueness result is then  used to  argue for a definition of assortative 
mating based on preferences and not on some exogenous surplus function. 
The implication however is th a t w ith a preference based definition, only a 
very narrow class of preferences can exhibit assortative mating. I t tu rns out
3See amongst otliers Burdett and Coles [13], Block and Ryder [12], McNamara and 
Collins [42] and Smith [69].
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th a t only w ith  vertical heterogeneity assortative m ating is unambiguously 
defined. For the perfect matching model specified w ith  preferences exhibit­
ing non transferable utility (NTU), it follows from the m ain Proposition th a t 
negative assortative m ating cannot occur as an  equilibrium outcome. More 
interestingly however, the implication for models w ith  transferable utility 
(TU) is th a t w hat is usually referred to  as negative assortative m ating in  the 
literature4 is drastic. The equilibrium preferences in a TU two-sided m atch­
ing model exhibit vertical heterogeneity. W ith  transferable utility, prefer­
ences will switch because the side payments are sufficiently large.
In  section 3.1, the uniqueness result is derived. In  section 3.2, assorta­
tive m ating is defined and it turns out to  be defined unambiguously only 
if individuals have identical preferences, i.e. there is Vertical Heterogeneity. 
Section 3.3 relates this to  the results in  assignment games and it is shown 
th a t the optim al outcome is incompatible w ith  negative assortative m ating 
as defined in section 3.2.
3.1 Uniqueness in a two-sided perfect match­
ing model
The basic framework in this paper consists of a two-sided marriage model. 
Consider two disjoint sets M  =  {M*}, F  =  {Fi}, i € I  =  {1,..., rz,}. This 
implies th a t the mass of bo th  populations is equal: tlm =  rip =  n. Below the 
analysis will be generalised to  the case of a continuous distribution of types. 
Each female Fi has rational (i.e. complete and transitive) preferences over 
all males in  M . Likewise for all Mi over F. Preferences will be represented 
using the conventional notation Fk y Mi F], Mi strictly prefers Fk to  FJ.
4See for example Becker [7].
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W ithout loss of generality5, it will be assumed th a t any m atch is preferred 
to  being single. A matching /1 can be defined as a one-to-one correspondence 
from M  U F  onto itself of order two (p2(x) =  x) such th a t p(Mi) E F  and
v(Fi) e  M.
A m atching p  is individually rational if it is not blocked by any individual 
agent. I t  is stable if it is individually rational and if it is not blocked by any 
pair of agents, one female and one male. All agents have perfect information 
about the preferences and there are no frictions in  the market (i.e. a blocking 
pair can be formed at not cost). I t  can be shown th a t a stable matching exists 
for every marriage market (i.e. for any preferences). This existence result 
is pu t forward by Gale and Shapley [27]. In  general however, the stable 
m atching is not unique. In  th is section, a class of preferences is defined for 
which the stable matching is unique. This is the purpose of proposition 6
P ro p o s i t io n  6 There exists a unique stable matching p(Fi) =  Mi,  Vi E I  if 
the preferences satisfy:
VM{ E M  : Fi >-Mt Fj, Vj < i
V F i E F  : M i  >-Fi M ^ V j  <  i  
P ro o f . Suppose there exists a stable matching pi different from p  w ith  for 
some i  pi (Fi) =  M k, k i. Given the definition of a stable matching there 
must also exist some j  =£ k such th a t p'(Mj) =  Fi, I ^  j .  Let A =  max{z : 
/ / ( F i )  =  M k,k  =?i}  =  max { j  : p^M j)  =  F „  / ^  j } .  Then p'(Fx) =  M k 
implies A >  k. Likewise, p'(M \)  =  Fi implies A >  /. Given preferences (3.1), 
it follows th a t M \ >~Fx M k and F\ Fi- F\ and M \  form a blocking pair 
and hence p r is not a stable match. Since the blocking pair is always F\  and 
M \,  the only stable matching (there always exists a stable matching, Gale 
and Shapley [27]) is p(Fi) =  Mi, Vi E I. ■
5Tlie more general model is discussed at lengtli in Roth and Sotomayor [62].
The intuition behind the preferences (3.1) is as follows. Suppose each 
individual can be given a rank i. The proof can be seen as some recursive 
elimination process or a specific form of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. The 
preferences are defined such th a t the for 2 =  7, bo th  the male and the female 
must prefer each other above anyone else. Hence, they rank each other as 
highest. Clearly, th a t pair will always be a blocking pair unless they are 
matched w ith  each other. Now consider bo th  sexes w ith  type i  =  7 — 1. 
Given the preferences (3.1), they must prefer type 7 and type 7 — 1 above 
all other types. It may be th a t they most prefer a partner of type 7, bu t 
they can never be matched w ith  type 7 since then  bo th  types 7 (i.e. each 
from the opposite sex) would form a blocking pair. Hence, bo th  sexes of type 
7 — 1 will be matched to  each other. If they are matched to  a type j  <  7 —1, 
together they will form a blocking pair. In  general, any two partners w ith  the 
same rank must prefer each other above any partner of a lower rank, given 
preferences (3.1). Sinoe all types of a higher rank already form a blocking 
pair (from our induction argument above), they also form a blocking pair if 
matched w ith  a lower type. In  other words, as long as there is no type of the 
other sex w ith a lower rank which is preferred to  the type w ith  equal rank, 
equilibrium is unique.
Note th a t th is does not exclude a marriage market w ith  a unique stable 
matching where fJ.(Fi) =  M*, w ith i ^  k. However, w ith  an appropriate 
” relabelling” of the individuals, the same result can be obtained. This is the 
result of the fact th a t the ordering of types does not affect the outcome.
C o ro lla ry  3 Any stable matching ia{Fi) =  Mk, i ^ k ,  is unique if the prefer­
ences of M[ and F[, V7 6 7 satisfy (3.1), where M[ =  p(Ff) and F[ =  p 2(Fi)
P ro o f. Immediate from Proposition 6. ■
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C o ro lla ry  4 There is a unique stable matching ^(Ff) 
satisfying:
(Vertical H eterogeneity)
VM i e M  :Fk y Mi Fj , \fk > j  
VF* e F  : M k > Fi Mj,Vk >  j
(H orizontal H eterogeneity)
VM i £  M  : ^  F ^ V ?  
V F i G F i M i ^ M ^ V j
P ro o f. Immediate from Proposition 6. ■
In  the case of Vertical Heterogeneity all individuals have identical pref­
erences over the other types, so there is a kind of ” objective” ranking of all 
types of bo th  sexes.6 In  the case of horizontal heterogeneity, each individual 
has a different most preferred individual. This implies a ’’subjective” ranking 
of the types of the other sex. Vertical Heterogeneity and Horizontal Hetero­
geneity are two limit cases of the preferences (3.1). In  fact, the preferences 
of (3.1) can be considered the set of all convex combinations of Vertical and 
Horizontal Heterogeneity. Note th a t the preferences (3.1) show some resem­
blance w ith  single peakedness. However, the requirement (3.1) differs in two 
respects. First, it is stronger th an  mere single peakedness since there has 
to be some connection between the natural ordering of bo th  sets. Second, 
in another respect it is also slightly weaker since only an  order restriction is 
imposed, comparable in spirit to  Single Crossing Conditions or Hierarchical 
Adherence (Roberts [57]). This is relevant when preferences are represented 
by utility functions.
6Note also tliat tlie preference restriction (3.2) is over tlie whole set of types thus 
imposing an order over the whole set. This is not the case in (3.1).
=  Mi for preferences
(3.2)
(3.3)
This result can be generalised to  continuous preferences. Consider E 
M  and F{ E F  distributed according to  tlie cumulative distribution functions 
Gm  and GF. W ithout loss of generality, let M  =  F  — [0,1]. The rank of 
an individual will then  be given by the value of the distribution function: Fi 
and Mj  have the same rank if and only if Gf (F{) =  Gm (M 7). Proposition 6 
can now be generalised.
P ro p o s it io n  7 There exists a unique stable matching fJ<(Fi)
Gp(Fi) =  Gm (Mj), V i , j  E [0,1], if the preferences satisfy:
V M j E M  : F i y Mj Fk, V k < i  
VFi E F  : Mj y F. M ^ k  <  j
P ro o f . As in  Proposition 6 ■
The intuition is exactly identical to  the case of a discrete and countable 
distribution. No type of the other sex of a lower rank th a n  your own is 
preferred above the type of the same rank. Clearly, the corollaries can easily 
be extended to  the more general case. For the remainder of the paper, the 
more general model and notation will be used. Note th a t the countable 
discrete case is a special case of a uniform distribution: UF(Fi) =  
implies i =  j .
3.2 Assortative M ating
In  common language, assortative m ating is loosely defined as the ’’m ating 
of ( un)likes” . The word assortative is derived from the French assorter: 
to  sort, to  arrange according to  similar characteristics. W ith  such a broad 
definition, two possible interpretations can be pursued. One defines this 
assorting based on an exogenous characteristic (say colour), independent of
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=  M j,  with
(3-4)
the preferences. The other is to  define ” likes” endogenously, derived from 
the preferences of the agents. In  w hat follows, the second in terpretation is 
chosen. This is in line w ith  the interpretation most adhered to  in  neoclassical 
economic thought w ith its foundation in  utilitarianism. Revealed preference 
arguments however cannot entirely dismiss objectivism. Assortative m ating 
requires some objective measure of which characteristics are ” alike” . Based 
on the individuals’ preferences, some aggregate measure of ’’likeness” will be 
derived. This Section proceeds first by defining assortative mating. Then, 
the equilibrium outcome under th a t definition is derived and it is shown th a t 
no equilibrium can exhibit negative assortative mating.
All individuals of bo th  sexes have- a natural order over the types of the 
other sex. In  the literature, assortative m ating is implicitly defined by some 
natural order over the alternatives which is common to all types. Becker [7] 
for example assumes th a t for all females, say, the value of a m atch monoton- 
ically increases in the type of the male. This implies there exists a natural 
order of males common to all females. A similar natural order of females 
exists th a t is common to all males. Here, the common natural order in ad­
dition is obtained from the aggregation of the individuals’ preferences. The 
formal definition reads
D efin itio n  3 There is an common natural order of all types of one sex pro­
vided:
VMi € M  : Fj )~Mi Fk, Vj >  k (3.5)
and
VFi E F  : Mm M n, Vm >  n (5-6)
This definition imposes a natural order on each of the sets M  and F  
separately. I t is im portant to  note there is no connection between the two
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rankings. In  the general specification of the preferences (3.1), bo th  restric­
tions on the preferences are connected through the type i. The intuition of 
the preferences (3.1) is th a t a type Fi does not have preferences where Mi is 
ranked lower th an  position i. Here, no such relative ranking (i.e. w ith  cross 
reference to  the other set) is required.7
The aggregate ranking (i.e. the common natural order) necessary for the 
notion of assortative m ating has been pinned down. I t  is now trivial to  de­
fine positive and negative assortative mating. Assortative m ating necessarily 
makes the link to  an allocation p.
D efin itio n  4 Provided the preferences satisfy the common natural order re­
striction with Fi and M\ the highest ranked types, a Matching p{Ff) =  Mj 
exhibits:
P o s i t i v e  Assortative Mating if Gf {F{) =  GM{p(Fi)), Vi 6 [0,1];
N e g a tive  Assortative Mating if Gp(Fi) =  1 — G m (p(Fi)), Vi 6 [0,1],
W ith  the restriction of a common order, the objective is now to  look at 
the set of equilibrium allocations w ithin th a t restriction. This gives rise to 
the main result of this Section.
P ro p o s it io n  8 ( Im p o ss ib i l i ty  o f  N e g a tive  A s s o r ta t i v e  M a t in g )  There 
can never be a stable match exhibiting Negative Assortative Mating. More-
7In tlie definition of assortative mating, the qualifier ’’objective” could be added. One 
could argue that all individuals can also have identical preferences over the different 
matches p, rather than over the individuals with whom to match. This requires preferences 
to satisfy horizontal heterogeneity as in equation (3.3). Such a ’’subjective” definition of 
assortative mating is tautological since all agree on what the best match is and thus no 
other stable matching can be the equilibrium outcome. It does not allow the individuals 
to be ranked, only the matches. For the remainder of this paper therefore, assortative 
mating will refer to objective assortative mating.
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over, under the common natural order restrictions there is always a unique 
stable matching exhibiting Positive Assortative Mating.
P ro o f . The common natural order restrictions (3.5) and (3.6) jointly, and 
the preferences satisfying Vertical Heterogeneity (3.2), are similar b u t not 
identical. Vertical Heterogeneity is more specific since it imposes a connection 
between the natural order of the two sets. However, the additional condition 
in the definition of positive and negative assortative m ating th a t Fi and 
Mi are the highest ranked types also imposes this connection. As a result, 
(3.5), (3.6) and the definition of assortative m ating jointly is identical to  the 
condition (3.2), Vertical Heterogeneity. From Proposition 7, the equilibrium 
is unique and satisfies: fa(Fi) =  Mj w ith  Gp(Fi) =  Gm (Mj), V i , j  6  [0,1]. 
This is Positive Assortative Mating. ■
The proposition highlights the fact th a t negative assortative m ating is a 
m atter of labelling the natural order. If the highest ranked types are labelled 
one, then there is no doubt. Suppose now the highest male is labelled zero, 
then the equilibrium allocation is fa(Fi) =  Mj w ith  Gp(F{) =  1 — GM(Mj). 
But this is not negative assortative m ating since the most preferred male is 
still matched w ith  the most preferred female. The only difference is th a t 
they are labelled differently. Based on their preferences they are positively 
assorted.
Notice th a t this definition involves an  extremely strong restriction on the 
preference structure of individuals. If it is not satisfied, assortative m ating is 
not defined. In  th a t sense this is a negative result, sinoe any statem ent about 
assortative m ating has to  be made w ithin a framework of these preferences. 
However, this does not imply th a t this restriction is irrelevant. Vertical 
Heterogeneity has intuitive appeal and is frequently assumed in  economic 
modelling w ith  heterogeneous agents.
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So far in  th is Chapter, the matching problem has been considered in 
term s of the bare bones preferences of individuals. Introducing utilities th a t 
satisfy these preferences does not alter anything. Consider the following 
example. Let all males have preferences over matches w ith  females such th a t 
duM/dFj >  0 and similar for the females dup/dM i >  0. Though th is does 
not necessarily imply th a t utility is type independent, i.e. Oum /QM i 0, it 
does imply th a t all types of one sex have identical preferences over the types 
of the other sex. Clearly, irrespective of whether inputs are substitutes, 
i.e. dP u p /d M id F jcP iiM /d M id F j  ^  0, the unique stable tti atching will he 
=  Fi. The inference is th a t if the two highest types are not m atched 
together, they can block any matching. This is also true for any pair below 
th a t is not matched to  a partner of the same rank, given th a t all higher 
ranked partners are matched to  a partner w ith the same rank.
3.3 The Assignment game
In  the Sections above, the model is defined in term s of preferences. Moreover, 
the introduction of utilities does not alter the results, provided utility is Non 
Transferable (NTU). Allowing for side-payments however, will change the 
initial pay-offs and can change the preferences. This class of Transferable 
Utility (TU) models has extensively been discussed in the literature and is 
known as the assignment game, originally formulated by Shapley and Shubik 
[66]. In  this Section, it is shown th a t w ith  a definition of Assortative M ating 
derived from the preferences of individuals, Negative Assortative M ating is 
impossible, even in  TU models .
Again, as in Section 3.2, a slightly simplified version will be discussed
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where the number of males equals the number of females8. Consider the 
same sets of agents F  and M , and a m atrix of real non-negative numbers ay- 
associated w ith each partnership of ( i , j )  in  F  x M. The private benefit to  a 
female Fi from a partnership w ith a male Mj is /y  for the female and r?2y for 
the male, so th a t -f f y  =  ay . A feasible assignment can be represented 
by a m atrix x =  (xy) of zeros and ones such th a t Yli x ij =  Yhj xij — 1- Let 
Ui =  my and Vj =  /y  if Xy =  1. A feasible outcome is stable if Ui -f Vj >  a^-, 
V(z, j )  6 S  x S. The stability condition does not require the specification of 
any ” out-of-equilibrium” pay-offs. The reason is th a t the equilibrium sought 
for here is cooperative and th a t given TU, the only relevant information is 
in the sum of the out-of-equilibrium pay-offs. Cooperation between a pair of 
a male and a female agent is needed.
Generally, results are comparable w ith  the results from the NTU model. 
Most substantially, Shapley and Shubik [66] show th a t the set of stable out­
comes coincides w ith  the core and th a t it is non-empty. They also show th a t 
although side-payments are allowed between members of different partner­
ships, they do not occur in  equilibrium. The main result deviating from NTU 
models is however th a t any stable outcome x is compatible w ith  an  optim al 
assignment, i.e. a stable matching maximises to ta l ou tpu t OLijXij. Even 
though this optimality result does not imply uniqueness, it follows th a t if 
there exists no assignment xf x  such th a t a ijx ij then
equilibrium is unique. W ithout loss of generality, this will be assumed for 
the remainder of the paper.
It now becomes nearly trivial to  reproduce Becker’s [7] argument: the 
decentralised outcome always yields the optim al outcome. Clearly, this is 
nothing more th an  the Shapley and Shubik [66] optim ality result. W hat
sTlie notation draws lieavily from Roth and Sotomayor [62].
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Becker lias introduced however is the notion of Assortative Mating, this by 
imposing some additional structure on the general assignment game. His 
definition of assortative m ating is daij/dM i  >  0 and datij/dFj >  0. In  the 
n  =  2 case for example, th a t implies th a t a n  >  a J2 >  a 22 and a n  >  <*21 >  
c*22- T hat does not exclude the equilibrium assignment
x =
0 1 ^ 
V 1 ° /
as long as the a 12 +  a 2i >  a n  4- <*22- This is the case when the function 
a  exhibits substitutability: cPa^/dMidFj <  0. Stability in  th is  assignment 
game requires m 21 +  f u  >  a 22 and m \2 4- /21 >  a n .
It can now easily be shown th a t these conditions cannot be consistent 
w ith the definition of Assortative M ating derived from the preferences of 
all individuals. The reason is th a t given these conditions individual prefer­
ences are reversed for an equilibrium to exist. In  the  n  =  2 example, it is 
impossible for both  rrz13 <  m n  and / 21 <  f u  (condition necessary for As­
sortative M ating to be defined unambiguously) since this is in  contradiction 
w ith m \2 +  /21 >  a n -  In  other words, the definition of Assortative Mating 
daij/dM i >  0 and da^/dF j >  0 adopted by Becker [7] is based on some 
exogenous characteristic, i.e. the contribution to  to ta l output, and not on 
the aggregation of individuals’ preferences. In  th a t sense, any outcome is 
possible. The fact th a t optim ality is obtained is merely due to  the property 
of assignment games as shown in Shapley and Shubik [66].
3.4 Concluding Remarks
The results in this Chapter are bo th  positive and negative. The positive 
result is th a t a large class of preferences is identified for which the two-sided
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perfect matching model has a unique solution. Moreover, the set of prefer­
ences yielding uniqueness is the convex combination of two familiar bench­
mark preferences: Vertical and Horizontal Heterogeneity. The other result is 
negative in  two respects. First, it is shown th a t only for a very small class 
of preferences (i.e. Vertical Heterogeneity) assortative mating, however often 
referred to  in  economics, is unambiguously defined. Second, if it is defined 
unambiguously, negative assortative m ating is impossible. The implication 
of the first aspect is th a t one either accepts or rejects such restrictions on 
the preferences. In  describing a marriage market for example, many people 
will have difficulties accepting there is such a th ing as identical preferences 
over mates. Love very often is in the eye of the beholder. O n the other hand, 
dropping ’’identical preferences” assumptions will leave very little economic 
theories entirely in tact. The implications of the second negative result are 
far more dramatic. If inputs are substitutes in  production, negative assor­
tative m ating is socially optimal. W ith  NTU it cannot be achieved by the 
m arket mechanism.
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Chapter 4 
Working for a B etter Job
We like to  believe th a t we do not merely work because there is money on 
our account a t the end of the month. Certainly, sociologist and psychologists 
have a range of alternative explanations, of which status may well be a promi­
nent one. However, even as an economist there is something to  be said about 
the motives of a worker to  provide effort. Incentives schemes and bonuses, 
as firm and business jargon is plenty of, is clearly relevant, bu t th a t is still 
related to  the end-of-the-month pay check. As such, they are well understood 
in the traditional analysis, w ith  or w ithout asymmetric information and un­
certainty. Nonetheless, incentive schemes cannot explain why for example a 
Junior Graduate a t nearly all top consulting firms or merchant banks upon 
entry works a t least 70 hours per week at a fixed annual wage and one year 
later earns no less th an  one and a half to  two times the entry wage, pu tting  
in about the same number of hours. This is not a typical phenomenon re­
lated to  jobs for economists. Medical doctors specialising in hospitals work 
legendary long hours verging on insanity. This equally applies to  solicitors, 
barristers and architects active in partnerships. W ith  leisure a normal good, 
the standard neoclassical effort supply model would predict th a t in all these
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cases the  more junior employee works considerably less hours.
In  the  quest for an  explanation of th is labour m arket behaviour, some 
particular features of these m arkets are w orth noting. F irst, those workers 
entering the firm or the labour m arket know th a t there is a hierarchy of 
jobs to  be performed. Second, they do realise th a t they will not necessarily 
perform the same job: they have the possibility to  move up in  the hierarchy 
depending on their performance. As a result, labour market decisions do not 
only take into account the current wage, but also the future career plan and 
thus future wages. Moreover, many firms take great care in designing these 
career plans for their employees, conditional upon performance of course.
This Chapter would like to  argue th a t ”better-job” opportunities in a 
determ inistic context are of significant importance to  explain labour m arket 
behaviour. For th a t purpose, the standard neoclassical effort supply model 
is extended to  capture the notion of ” better-job” opportunities. This notion 
can be split up into two determinants. F irst, it implies th a t there is some 
hierarchy or ranking of jobs w ith  a higher pay-off to  the higher ranked jobs. 
In  other words, the productivity of a worker is not merely a function of her 
ability, b u t also of the type of job performed. The existence of a distribution 
of jobs is taken as a technological characteristic: the m anager’s job is different 
from the  shop floor worker’s w ith the b o th  jobs performed by the same person 
yielding different output levels. The equilibrium allocation of jobs will be 
such th a t the highest productivity workers get the highest productivity jobs. 
This implies th a t the productivity of any worker is a function of her Rank- 
Order.
Second, ” better-job” opportunities are inherently dynamic: in a regime 
where workers change jobs w ithin the hierarchy, the job performed in the next 
period will have some relation to the job performed in the current period.
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N ot only do firms tend to reward their hard-working and loyal employees 
w ith  a be tte r job, it is also efficient to  allocate the higher ranked workers 
to  the higher ranked jobs. In  each period, there is an  efficient allocation of 
workers to  jobs w ith  the workers’ types determined by the effort provided in 
the past. Individuals will improve their type in  the next period by working 
hard now. This affects their rank in the distribution of workers and hence 
the allocation to  a higher productivity job. These two premises capture the 
notion of ” better-job” opportunities and imply th a t labour effort is modelled 
as a dynamic consumption-leisure decision in a Rank-Order tournam ent en­
vironment.
W ith in  this framework, it can trivially be shown th a t the effort supply 
decision of a worker does not merely take into account the trade-off between 
current consumption and effort, bu t between all future consumption th a t is 
affected by current effort. R ather th an  by differences in  preferences, hours 
of work are explained by the incentive structure and the forward looking 
behaviour of workers. For as much as there is a real effect on the increase 
in ability or skill of the worker, this extra effort is socially optimal. This is 
nothing more th an  a reformulation of hum an capital theory. However, if the 
productivity of a worker is not merely a function of her ability, hu t also of 
the job performed, the implication is th a t there is an  inefficient excess-supply 
of effort compared to  the social optimal. This is due to  the fact th a t every 
individual gets a marginal benefit from extra effort in  having a higher ranked 
job in the next period. In  equilibrium no worker will change rank, bu t still 
it is not individually rational not to  put in  the extra effort. The reason is 
th a t doing so prevents lower ranked types to  become higher ranked. The 
inefficiency is the result of an  external effect of the individual effort choice on 
the pay-off of all other workers: increasing one’s effort increases one’s future
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rank bu t also lowers some other workers’ rank. By definition, rank represents 
a zero-sum game: the number of positions gained by one player equals the 
to ta l of positions lost by all other players together. In  fact, th is Rank-Order 
Inefficiency feature exactly fits the definition of the ra t race: ’’the struggle 
to m aintain one’s position in work or life” . In  the economic literature, th is is 
usually referred to  in a signalling context (Akerlof [3]). The m ain contribution 
of this paper is to  derive the ra t race result not as a signalling equilibrium (the 
information environment is symmetric and deterministic (but dynamic)), bu t 
as a result of the allocation of agents in  the m atching market.
The promotion model is used to  study the effect of different labour m arket 
environments on the labour supply decision. First, the distributional impact 
is analysed. There are three distinct channels through which distributional 
considerations have an  effect on the effort supply decision: the distribution 
of abilities, the skill premium and the job premium (i.e. the marginal re turn  
from performing a higher ranked job). Inequality in the  distribution of skills 
decreases effort whereas inequality in  the wage distribution (i.e. bo th  a higher 
skill and job premium) increases effort supply. Moreover, the effect of the 
ability distribution and the job premium effect are inefficient. Theoretically, 
the net aggregate effect of inequality on both  effort supply and efficiency 
is ambiguous. Subsequently, the rate of turnover, i.e. the  number of job 
allocations per unit of time, is introduced in  the  model. I t  can be shown 
th a t a higher turnover increases the Rank-Order Inefficiency. I t follows th a t 
effort increases w ith the rate of turnover. This indicates th a t the institu­
tional characteristics of the labour m arket are of considerable importance for 
understanding effort decisions and efficiency.
The examples at the outset of the paper could easily be earmarked as 
mere anecdotal evidenoe. In  order to  support the  theoretical analysis and in
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order to  add to  the credibility of the underlying assumptions, the theoretical 
results are matched w ith  seven stylised facts from the empirical labour market 
literature. Roughly, these stylised facts can he divided into observations 
within labour markets which cannot be explained by the standard analysis 
and a comparison between labour markets.
The remainder of the Chapter is organised as follows. In  the next Section, 
the basic model is being laid out and the paper is situated relative to  the 
existing theoretical literature. In  Section 4.2, the main results and the Rank- 
Order Inefficiency are derived. The first stylised facts are discussed. Section 
4.3 discusses the impact of distribution on effort supply and efficiency and 
uses the empirical literature to  sign the ambiguity. In  Section 4.4, the  rate 
of turnover is introduced. Again, the results are matched w ith  the empirical 
literature. A n extension to  a fife cycle model is proposed in Section 4.5. The 
Chapter is rounded up w ith some Concluding Remarks.
4.1 The Basic M odel and Related Literature
Consider an  economy w ith  a set of heterogeneous agents. There are infinitely 
many individuals and the to ta l mass of the population is one. Agents are 
indexed by a type 6 6 0  C 5ft+, the characteristics of the individual. The 
characteristics of all agents in the economy are distributed according to  the 
cumulative distribution function F{9), w ith  positive density function /(# ) . 
Characteristics are under all circumstances perfectly observable: information 
is bo th  symmetric and complete.
Individuals have the choice between two goods, consumption C  and effort 
(or hours worked) e. Preferences from consumption of these goods are repre­
sented by the strictly quasi-concave utility function u(C, e) =  U (C ) — e, w ith
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TJc >  0 and U strictly quasi-concave. The quasi-linear preferences are chosen 
to simplify the analysis below. The whole analysis carries through however 
for any strictly monotonic and strictly quasi-concave (in bo th  consumption 
and leisure, the negative of effort) functional form.
The only endowment of an  agent is leisure. However, there is a technol­
ogy th a t transform s effort into consumption. This technology is offered by 
atomless firms competing for the workers. This model entirely defines the 
standard neoclassical effort supply model. This model has been extended to  
the case where productivity of a worker is type-dependent. As in  the opti­
mal taxation literature (Mirrlees [46]), productive ability of the individual 
increases in  the type 9. ' *
For the purpose of this paper, two additional features are introduced. 
First, the technology transforming effort into consumption. In  the introduc­
tion, the premise is proposed th a t there exists a distribution of jobs, each 
w ith different productivity, given an identical worker. This is interpreted as 
a technological feature. In  an economy there are tasks of different produc­
tivity and all of them  have to  be performed. A job will by characterised by 
a type (f) €  4> C and jobs are distributed according to  the cumulative 
distribution function G{(j)) w ith  positive density function
Total productivity of a worker depends bo th  on her own type and on the 
type of the job she performs. For a given level of effort, her productivity is 
given by the production function T(9 , <fi) (with Te >  0, T# >  0 and Tq$ >  01).
1Tlie assumption of strategic complementarities is not vital for our framework. With 
strategic substitutes the highest type workers would be matched with the lowest type 
workers and consumption would be a decreasing function of the rank. The lowest jobs are 
most desirable and the Rank-Order Tournament still holds as a function of the inverse 
rank of the worker. The crucial part is that the cross-partial is different from zero. If that 
is not the case, rank does not matter in any way and the solution to the model would be
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The equilibrium allocation of workers to  jobs in  th is assignment game will 
determine each individual’s wage. Any allocation will be referred to  as a 
matching m. I t  is a one-to-one correspondence of 0  U $  onto itself of order 
two such th a t m(9) £ $  and rafy>) £ 0 . Shapley and Shubik [66] show 
th a t a stable matching exists and in  Becker [7] it is shown this allocation is 
unique. In  addition, the non-cooperative N ash equilbrium w ith  one party, 
say the firms holding the jobs, announcing a type of the other party  coincides 
w ith this equilibrium. The unique equilibrium matching m* exhibits positive 
assortative m ating (Becker [7]): 4> =  m*(9) if and only if F (9 ) =  G{(f)). In  
equilibrium, a worker is allocated to  a job th a t has the same rank as the 
worker.
The surplus of this m atching is split into profits and a wage: T(9 ,0 ) =  
7r(0, (f>)+c(0, <f>). A n individual worker will a t the margin be able to  command 
what she can contribute to  the surplus. Hence the first-order condition must 
satisfy:
* ( « , * ) (4-i )
Taking in to  account the equilibrium allocation ra*, such th a t 4> =  G~l 
the wage received by a worker of type 9 is equal to
(4.2)
The wage received is thus not only a function of the type 9, bu t as a result 
of the equilibrium allocation also of the rank. Since G  is monotonically 
increasing and >  0, it follows th a t Cp >  0. W ithout loss of generality, in 
what follows the wage of a worker is w ritten  as c(0, F(9)).
The same applies to  the firm side. I t  is assumed th a t firms have zero 
mass and open one job at cost e only by making a random draw from the  job
identical to tlie standard neoclassical effort supply modeL
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distribution G((j>). W ith  firms Bertrand2 competing at the entry decision, 
expected profits En(9, (j>) are driven to  zero.
Once allocated to a certain job, the to ta l consumption is in  addition 
a function of the amount of effort provided. Hence, C  =  c{e^9,F{9)). 
In  order to  ensure existence, functional forms will be considered th a t are 
monotonically increasing in  all the arguments and further it is assumed th a t 
c f (9 =  0) =  03. This model is identical to  the standard neoclassical effort 
supply model w ith  the additional feature of productivity a function of the  job 
performed. This is interpreted as a deterministic Rank-Order Tournam ent 
w ith  heterogeneous agents. In  the static game, an individual strategy is a 
choice of effort in  order to  maximise utility subject to  the technology. Since 
types, and hence the distribution of types, are exogenous, an individual’s 
optimising strategy is independent of other players’ strategies. As a result, 
an optimising strategy is dominant. The solution to  this static  optim isation 
problem w ith  perfect observability satisfies all requirements for existence and 
uniqueness of a general competitive equilibrium. The first-order condition 
equalises the marginal utility of consumption w ith  the marginal disutility of 
effort. From the F irst Theorem of Welfare Economics th is solution is Pareto  
Efficient. Moreover, w ith atomless firms competing, profits are driven to  zero 
and all the surplus accrues to  the workers.
2Assuming there is a cost e >  0 of opening a job is necessary to avoid that firms continue 
to open jobs until all jobs offered are of the highest type. Note that the equilibrium 
distribution G(<f>) is in fact the truncated distribution of G{4>). More jobs may be opened 
than the mass of workers as long as expected profits are non-negative. In equilibrium only 
the best jobs with a total mass one are filled. Though it is beyond the purpose of this 
paper, it can be shown that with lim e —» 0, in equilibrium there is always a non-degenerate
distribution G of jobs on offer.
3Tliis assumption will ensure that a number of Pareto Dominated equilibria are elimi­
nated (see Spence [70]).
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The second additional feature captures the dynamic effect of working for 
a be tter job. The game is repeated twice w ith the individual type in  the 
second period a function of the effort in the first period. W ith  stationary 
utility functions, the variables will be time-indexed by t  G {0,1}. Individuals’ 
types in  period t =  1, are a function of their past performance, i.e. the effort 
expended in period 0. 9\ =  g(eo, 9o), w ith  g concave and ge >  0 and ge >  0.
Since the type 9\ is affected by the current choice of effort, effort today 
will determine future consumption from increased ability. This is nothing 
more th a n  a hum an capital effect. Workers consider current effort as an  
investment in  skills. Since the acquisition of skills does not depend on other 
players’ strategies, strategies in the presence of the hum an capital effect 
rem ain dominant. In  addition however, next period’s ability also affects 
the distribution of types F\{9). W ith  the Rank-Order Tournament which 
matches higher types to  better jobs, productivity is a function of the rank. 
It follows th a t next period’s rank and thus consumption is a function of 
current period’s effort. Strategies now are no longer dominant, since next 
period’s rank is also a function of all other players’ strategies. Rank is a 
zero sum game: moving up one position implies th a t someone else will move 
down one position. It follows th a t an equilibrium strategy will be a solution 
to  a fixed point problem. Note th a t in general, the type in period 1 is made 
a function of the type in  period 0. This will tu rn  out to  be a necessary 
condition for existence, parallel to  the so called Spenoe-Mirrlees or Single 
Crossing condition: higher types are more effective in transform ing effort 
into next period’s type. I t  is entirely reasonable to  assume th a t if a high and 
a low type have expended the same effort th is period, the  high type will still 
be a high type next period. Single Crossing does not axiomatically exclude 
leapfrogging though since the low type can pu t in more effort!
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Finally, a remark on the dynamic nature of the setting. I t  highlights 
the usefulness of a quasi-linear utility function. In  general, consumption 
smoothing affects the equilibrium level of effort. By definition, in  the quasi- 
linear case, there is no income effect. As a result, the consumption smoothing 
effect on effort is entirely annihilated4.
In  this Repeated Rank-Order Tournament, an  Equilibrium in  the decen­
tralised system will be a decision rule which, given an optim al strategy of all 
other individuals, maximises the utility of the individual. This has to  hold 
in every period. The concept is N ash Equilibrium. The objective of each in­
dividual is to  maximise to ta l discounted utility. The maximisation problem 
in each period t  E {0,1}, given the discount rate  p  <  1, solves
max \U(Ct) — et] 
s.t. Ct =  c(et,0 ,F t {0))
0i =  9{eo,0o)
Fo(0)
Before explicitly deriving the solution to  this problem, our approach will 
briefly be situated relative to  the existing literature. First, the dependence 
of productivity on the job performed is modelled as a Rank-Order Tourna­
ment, introduced by Lazear and Rosen [36]. They are compensation schemes 
which pay according to  an individual’s ordinal rank in an organisation rather 
th an  exclusively according to  his or her output level. Though the concept 
is by now used in  a fairly general way, the initial paper and the debate in 
the following literature concentrates on the unobservability of effort and the 
efficiency of Tournament contracts. Their m ain results however are derived 
under the assumption of identical agents. Then, depending on the degree
4Witli a non-separable utility function the results in this paper will continue to hold, 
but they have to be disentangled from the consumption-smoothing effect.
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of risk aversions, the social optim al contract can be achieved. This is no 
longer true when agents are heterogeneous. In  this paper, the randomness 
of observed effort will be dropped, but agents are heterogeneous. In  such a 
static and deterministic framework, Lazear and Rosen [36] predict a first best 
solution. This will also be the case in  our model. The inefficiency mentioned 
in the Introduction is due to  the repeated nature of the Tournament.
Throughout th is paper, it will become apparent th a t many of the results 
are conspicuously similar to  many of the standard asymmetric information 
(signalling, Principal-Agent) problems, even though in th is context there 
is no asymm etry of information: types and effort are perfectly observable 
in all periods! Consider for example the standard Spence [70] signalling 
model. Implicitly, the signalling model exhibits the Rank-Order Tournam ent 
feature in the sense th a t agents are heterogeneous w ith  the wage a function of 
the ranking of the types. There is a (partly) wasteful technology (typically 
education) which at some cost affects the wage received in  the job. The 
return  on education (i.e. the degree obtained) is perfectly observable, as is 
the effort provided in  our model. The m ain difference in  our model is th a t 
the employer does observe the types (rather th an  the perfectly correlated 
signal), and th a t the technology (as a function of effort) changes the types 
(rather th a n  the signal). Like Spence’s education technology can change the 
signal and thus the Rank-Order of workers in term s of the wage received, our 
dynamic technology can change the true types and their Rank-Order.
I t is then  no surprise th a t there is a necessary condition for equilibrium 
which is congruent w ith  the Spence-Mirrlees5 or Single Crossing condition. In
5Note that the model in this paper is formally related to the Mirrlees [46] Optimal 
Taxation framework. Thongh in this context, there is no information problem, it will turn 
out (see below) that income taxes will have welfare effects.
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the signalling literature, this condition requires th a t higher types are more 
effective in ”producing” the signal, i.e. the marginal cost of education is 
decreasing in  type. If not, there is not enough informative value to  the signal. 
In  the optim al taxation literature, it requires th a t higher types have a lower 
preference for extra leisure th an  lower types. In  our matching context, it 
is essential th a t higher types are more effective in  transforming effort this 
period in  a higher type next period. In  reduced form, it will imply th a t 
higher types have a lower preference for extra  leisure.
Very closely related in spirit to  the Spenoe signalling model is Akerlof’s 
[3] ra t race model. Because of imperfect observability of effort, firms reward 
workers based on their output and the rank of their output. Hence, workers 
will pu t in more effort th an  efficient because all of the  other workers do. 
Every worker wants to  signal ability to  the employer. The overlap between 
signalling and the deterministic ra t raoe in  the promotion context is again 
very conspicuous. Firm s however do not use the workers’ outpu t as an indica­
tor to  be judged on, but the observable type which is a function of past effort. 
It highlights however an  additional characteristic of the ra t raoe: in labour 
market environments, the effort provided is not necessarily ’’wasted” , as is 
predicted by the signalling literature. Productivity actually increases. The 
problem is th a t because of the ra t race caused by the  allocation mechanism 
according to  rank, people sacrifice too much leisure. I t  is im portant to  note 
th a t however conspicuous the similarity of bo th  approaches, the source of the 
inefficiency here is clearly not the informational externality. The source here 
is the externality from allocating workers to  jobs. Productivity is not merely 
inherent in the worker’s characteristics, b u t also to  the job performed.
The overlap between the signalling literature and th is promotion analysis 
has been touched upon very closely by Holmstrom’s [31] discussion of Fama
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[21]. Fama argues th a t informational externalities are taken care of by the 
m arket in  a dynamic context. R eputation effects will police moral hazard 
problems: in the provision of effort now, managers do not only worry about 
their current income, but about the income in  all future periods. Henoe, 
in a repeated moral hazard problem w ith  past observed action, inefficiency 
will disappear as time goes to  infinity. Holmstrom claims th a t th is is true 
only w ith  a linear production technology. W hen the production technology 
is non-linear, the inefficiency does not disappear. Moreover, as an  example, 
Holmstrom discusses the example of matching workers to  jobs, which yields 
a convex returns to  ability function (as in Rosen’s [60] superstars). Clearly, 
our Rank-Order feature exactly yields such a convex returns function and 
is nothing more th an  a production function w ith  complementarities between 
workers matched to  jobs. The m ain difference though is th a t our analysis 
shows th a t this inefficiency holds even in a full information context. W hat 
Holmstrom and Fama interpret as reputation does not necessarily rely on 
imperfect observability. Fam a’s claim (i.e. informational externalities disap­
pear in the long run) still holds ground. W here Holmstrom believed to  have 
rejected his claim is not due to  informational externalities bu t to  allocative 
externalities!
Further, an  interesting investigation into the endogenous creation of so­
cial norms is of interest to  our framework. Cole, M ailath and Postlewaite [14] 
derive different social systems in a marriage framework. In  a perfect match­
ing context, the Rank-Order feature is endogenous w ith  complementarities 
between vertically heterogeneous types of bo th  sexes. S tatus th en  becomes 
the Rank-Order (according to  the prevailing sta tus conoept in  equilibrium) 
of the individual. Different conceptions of w hat constitutes sta tus (wealth, 
ancestors,...) can be supported in equilibrium. The technology affecting your
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rank is a capital accumulation decision and, similar to  the prom otion context, 
works intertem p orally.
Finally, the Rank-Order feature generating an  increase in the contribution 
can also be welfare improving when imbedded in a different general frame­
work. John Morgan [47] looks into the effect of Lotteries on the financing of 
public goods. He shows th a t lotteries generate higher contributions th a n  vol­
untary donations. Lotteries can be considered as a Rank-Order Tournament 
and the extra contribution it generates offsets the inefficient level of voluntary 
donations towards the provision of the public good. Clearly, in  this context 
the Tournament is welfare improving since the free rider problem th a t exists 
in the provision of a public good results in  a welfare inferior outcome to  s ta rt 
with. In  our model, the benchmark is efficient which implies th a t the extra 
effort contribution is welfare deteriorating.
4.2 The Main Results
Before discussing the solution of the decentralised economy and in  order to 
establish a benchmark for comparison of the results, the model is first solved 
by the Social Planner who has a U tilitarian Social Welfare Function as an 
objective6. She chooses all individuals’ level of effort in  bo th  periods such 
as to  maximise the discounted sum of utilities. T hat implies th a t she does 
not take into account any strategic effect from other players who look for an 
opportunity to  leapfrog. In  fact, by optimising for all individuals jointly, the 
planner acts as if she signs a joint contract for all workers and from which 
all of them  benefit. The socially optim al allocation (e f, C f ,9 )  satisfies
6Contrary to the asymmetric information literature where imperfect information is 
compared with full information, our benchmark compares the decentralised job allocation 
system with the centralised system.
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The solution to  th is differential equation is unique since the initial condition 
Ut (0) =  0 yields a definite solution when there is no individual strategic 
interaction. In  the second period, the choice of effort is identical to  the 
choice in the static  standard neoclassical framework. The efficient choioe of 
effort in  the first period is different from the static  benchmark. Lemma 8 
shows th a t, quite intuitively, effort in  the presence of a hum an capital effect 
is higher th an  effort in  a static  effort supply model.
L em m a  6 Effort in the presence of a human capital effect is higher than in 
the static case.
P ro o f . The necessary condition for the hum an capital effect to  exist is 
Cq >  0. Applying the chain rule yields th a t =  Uc Ce9e >  0. W ith
U (C ) strictly concave, it follows th a t e f  is strictly bigger th an  the effort in 
the static  case. ■
Because the agent now takes into account the effect of current effort on 
next period’s ability, she does not only care about current consumption but 
also about future consumption from becoming more skilled. The extra effort 
is in  fact an  investment in hum an capital and is efficient. W ith  reference to  
the discussion in the introduction about bonuses and incentives schemes, note 
th a t a bonus B  is entirely captured in  the optim al outcome (4.4) through 
the ’’production function” c(e) =  w  +  -B(e), where w  is the fixed wage.
Let us tu rn  now to the decentralised solution. I t  is trivial th a t a t t  =  1, 
the choice of effort will be a t the socially optim al level (e f, C f ,  9), since 
effort cannot get you a better job: there is no future period. For the same 
reason, there is no hum an capital effect and effort is a t the level of the static
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labour supply model. In  period 0 however, the individually rational choice 
of effort will incorporate the effect of current effort on the promotion. The 
decentralised outcome {bq,C q,9) satisfies:
dUo , du^dB, a u 1dF1 _ ,
de0 P 891 de0 P dFi de0  ^ ^
Current effort still has an  effect on the future skills (i.e. the hum an capital
effect ^ ) ,  bu t in  addition, current effort determines which job the worker
will be allocated to  in the next period: | ^ .  The more effort you provide
today, the higher the rank of your job tomorrow. More elaborately, the  first
order condition can equivalently be w ritten  as
dUo
deo PdCi 9 F d 9 1 )  de0 ' '
This highlights the fact th a t future consumption is affected by the effect of 
effort through bo th  the increase in ability and the effect on the rank of the 
job performed.
The first-order condition (4.5) is a necessary condition for the existence 
of Equilibrium.
P ro p o s it io n  9 A t t  =  0, a unique Equilibrium (eg,CJJ, 0) exists and it is 
entirely defined by the first order condition (4-5), provided the following con­
ditions are satisfied:
1. Single Crossing: > 0 ;
2. F  is continuous and has no mass points.
P ro o f . See Appendix. ■
The intuition behind the Single Crossing condition is identical to  the 
signalling and principal agent literature and is derived from the  second-order 
condition. F irst, suppose th a t the condition holds w ith  strict equality. I t
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follows th a t the marginal effect of current effort on next period’s type is the 
same irrespective of the current type. Hence, no one can obtain any future 
benefit from putting in  extra effort now and the equilibrium level of effort 
would be equal to  the level chosen by the social planner. If the  condition holds 
w ith a negative sign, the provision of effort would imply th a t the equilibrium 
is not a maximum.
The second condition has no equal in the signalling literature. In  the 
proof, it is shown technically where the condition comes from: now the  ef­
fort decision in  equilibrium is determined by the effect of all workers’ effort 
on their rank, w ith  the result th a t the properties of the  cumulative density 
function will determine th is rank effect. For intuitive understanding, con­
sider the following thought experiment. Workers are distributed according 
to a bimodal discrete cumulative density function Given the Single Cross­
ing condition, in  equilibrium investment by the lower types is a t the socially 
optim al level, since they cannot leapfrog. Hence, the best response for the 
higher types, given optimal investment of the lower types, is to  invest opti­
mally as well. However, given optim al investment by the higher types, the 
best response for the lower types is to  expend more effort and leapfrog to  
the highest rank. As a result, equilibrium does not exist in  pure strategies. 
This is not the case w ith continuous distributions because, however close 
together, there always exists a type between the higher and the  lower type 
which induces the higher type to  invest more effort. Note though th a t w ith  
a discrete distribution function, equilibrium does exist in  mixed strategies. 
The non-existence of pure strategies is equivalent to  some results in auction 
theory or to  the equilibrium strategy in a Bertrand duopoly w ith  different 
marginal costs.
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Given existenoe and uniqueness, equilibrium can be characterised and the 
efficiency can be compared to  the benchmark. Mere observation of equations 
(4.4) and (4.5) reveals th a t the decentralised equilibrium does not achieve 
first best. The term  will from now on be defined as the Rank-Order
Inefficiency (ROI) and Proposition 10 establishes the nature of the ineffi­
ciency
P ro p o s it io n  10 The equilibrium supply of effort in the decentralised system  
is super-optimal: e °  (9) <  ej (9), V0.
P ro o f . The Prom otion Inefficiency term  is strictly positive, since Up >  0, 
-^ e =  Fg9e >  0 and Qq >  0. W ith  Uc strictly concave, it follows th a t <! 
e*0.m
The intuition is straightforward. Because of the effect of future reallo­
cation, workers do not only take into account the marginal benefit of cur­
rent consumption, but also the marginal benefit of the future position. The 
m arginal benefit of a higher type is higher th a n  the marginal cost of extra 
effort, from the single crossing condition. This is inefficient because the extra 
effort does not translate into the extra income th a t follows from the higher 
rank. The reason is th a t each individual expends too much effort. The Single 
Crossing condition makes sure th a t it is less costly for the higher types to  
achieve a higher rank th an  for the lower types. As a result, the higher types 
manage to  avoid being leapfrogged by the lower types. The externality from 
the behaviour of all other agents here is clearly not an informational exter­
nality (there is full information) but it is due to  the marginal effect of being 
allocated to  a better job. Note th a t in th is Equilibrium, outpu t in the econ­
omy is higher th an  in the absence of the Rank-Order effect. Workers provide 
more effort and thus generate more consumption. However, the inefficiency
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is due to  the fact th a t th is extra consumption goes a t the cost of too much 
effort. In  this framework, GDP per capita clearly is not a good measure for 
utility.
Two Corollaries follow immediately from Proposition 10.
C o ro lla ry  5 Both the Rank-Order Inefficiency and equilibrium effort are 
increasing in type.
P ro o f . Imm ediate from Proposition 10 and the Single Crossing condition. ■
Even if the more productive types do not get a higher wage from being 
more productive, i.e. Cq =  0 , they get a higher wage from performing the 
higher ranked job. In  addition, they also marginally have to  work more in 
order to  m aintain their rank. If the marginal benefit of improving the  type 
were constant (i.e. gge =  0), there would be no inefficiency because rank 
would have no incentive effect.
C o ro lla ry  6 In equilibrium, the rank is maintained.
P ro o f . Imm ediate from Proposition 10 and the Single Crossing condition. ■
In  equilibrium, there is no leapfrogging. Everyone manages to  just avoid 
it because the higher types are marginally more effective in  improving their 
type in the next period.
Let us now tu rn  to  the empirical verification of these first results. To 
m atch a theoretical model to  empirical evidence is always a risky undertaking, 
if only because of the simplified nature of theoretical models and because of 
the m ultitude of different (often opposing) forces operating in  the reality. The 
purpose of the exercise here is to  show th a t the model does not contradict 
certain stylised facts. In  this Section, some w ithin labour m arket observations
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are discussed. In  the next Section, the model will be extended to  the analysis 
of turnover in  the labour market to  highlight some between labour market 
stylised facts.
1. Basic supply factors alone cannot explain differences in hours 
worked
The standard labour supply model predicts th a t, as a result of a change 
in earnings, there is a trade off between the income and the substitu tion 
effect. A change in the wage rate due to  taxation  or technology has an  am­
biguous effect on the hours worked. Though there are opposing claims about 
the sign of the aggregate effect, many authors find it to  be non-significant. 
In  an Econometrica article, Mroz [52] reviews th is literature and disputes 
the methodology of a number of papers th a t find a significant effect. He 
concludes: ’’The principal finding of th is analysis is th a t economic factors 
such as wage rates, taxes, and non-labour incomes have a small im pact on 
the supply behaviour...” , Mroz [52, p.795]. N ot only does th is piece of ev­
idence justify the use of a quasi-linear utility function, more importantly, 
it sets the agenda for this paper. Given there are differences in  the  supply 
behaviour of workers, be it w ithin or between labour markets, there m ust be 
an explanation beyond the impact of basic supply factors.
2. Hum an capital effects alone cannot explain wage differentials
Using firm level performance data, Medoff and Abraham  [43] and [44] dis­
tinguish relative wage differentials from relative productivity (i.e. reported 
performance). W ith in  one job type, experience can explain wage differen­
tials. About 40 percent of earnings differentials associated w ith  experience 
(both outside and w ithin the company) occur w ith in  the job type. However, 
they do not find support for the thesis th a t across different job types, experi­
ence explains relative wage differentials. They conclude: ” Since the fraction
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of the experience-earnings relationship th a t occurs w ithin [job types] is sub­
stantial, [...] a substantial portion of th is relationship cannot be explained 
by the hum an capital model of productivity augmenting on-the-job training” 
(Medoff and Abraham  [43, p.735]). Though they do not suggest a theory as 
to  why wages do not only reflect hum an capital accumulation effects, their 
findings justify our assumption th a t the wage as a measure for productivity 
depends on both ability and the job performed.
3. The distribution of wages is skewed to  the right
It is widely accepted th a t the distribution of income, and in th is context of 
labour income, is skewed to  the right, the log of income approximately being 
symmetrically distributed. I t can be argued th a t the underlying factor is the 
distribution of skills. Though it is no sinecure to  measure skills, it is clear th a t 
the distribution of say education is by far not as skewed as the distribution 
of wages. Hence, there must be some complementarity between the skill level 
and the job performed. This is exactly captured by the positive dependence 
of labour income on the Rank-Order in the distribution. The distributional 
aspects of the inefficiency in the model are extensively discussed in  the  next 
Section.
4.3 Efficiency and Distribution
In  the presence of a Rank-Order tournam ent, it is almost tautological th a t 
distributional aspects have a real effect. Mere observation of the technology 
which transform s effort into consumption shows how the distribution function 
enters the objective function. In  this Section, the aim is to analyse the effect 
of increased inequality on the supply-of-effort decision by workers. However, 
not only the distribution of skills F(6) will have an  effect bu t also the rates
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at which skills are remunerated (i.e. the wage distribution) will determine 
effort. In  our context, the wage distribution can be disentangled into the skill 
premium and what will be referred to  as the job premium. Like the literature 
on wage inequality (e.g. Murphy and Welch [53]), the skill premium is equal 
to the marginal increase in wages from having higher ability. In  our model, 
this is equal to  Cq. Because productivity is not only a function of ability, bu t 
also of the rank of the job performed, the wage distribution in  addition is 
a function of the marginal increase in the rank of the job. Technically, the 
marginal re tu rn  to  jobs (i.e. the job premium) is given by C p . B oth the skill 
and the job premium are derived from the effect of respectively 9 and F(9) 
on C  =  c(e, 9, F(9)). To illustrate these three distinct distributional effects, 
consider the first-order condition (4.5’) can be w ritten  as
The term  in brackets distinguishes the three channels through which equi­
librium effort is affected: f (9 ), the skill distribution; C p , the job premium; 
and C0, the skill premium. The skill premium determines the hum an capital 
effect whereas the job premium and the skill distribution jointly constitute 
the Rank-Order Inefficiency. In  w hat follows, we will derive the impact of 
inequality of each of these effects bo th  on effort and efficiency. W ithout 
jumping to  conclusions, it is clear th a t the skill premium effect will be effi­
cient, since it affects the efficient hum an capital accumulation decision. The 
job premium and the skill distribution effects will be inefficient (from Propo­
sition 10), since they relate to  the Rank-Order Inefficiency. However, from 
the same Proposition, we know th a t effort and inefficiency are correlated.
The Skill D is tr ib u tio n  E ffect. Since 9 is taken to  be an  indicator of the 
level of productive ability, F(9) can be referred to  as the skill distribution. 
In  order to  unequivocally be able to  assert whether one distribution is more
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or less equal th an  the other, the distribution functions th a t will be compared 
have to  satisfy second order stochastic dominanoe (i.e. a m ean preserving 
spread) w ith  respect to  each other. Consider two skill distributions jP(*) 
and H(-) (w ith their respective density functions /(• )  and h(-)) and, w ithout 
loss of generality, take H(-) to  be second order stochastically dominant, i.e. 
H(-) is more unequal th an  jP(-). For reasons of m athem atical trac t ability, 
the m ean preserving spread is modelled as a Sandmo transform ation7. This 
simply implies th a t, while maintaining the same mean, bo th  distributions 
have identical cumulative densities if the support is multiplied by a scale 
factor A >  1. If /u is the common mean, then  the variable 7  can be defined 
such th a t 7  =  A(9 — fj,) -f [x and F(9) =  H('y(9)), V#. I t follows th a t h(-) =  
A-1/(*). The Skill D istribution Effect produces the following result
P ro p o s it io n  11 (Skill D istribu tion  Effect) Both effort and the Rank- 
Order Inefficiency decrease as inequality in the skill distribution increases.
P ro o f. Consider the model from Section 4.1, fixing A  =  1 and w ith  the 
skill distribution H(9). Given the m ean preserving spread on H  from F , it 
follows
d U . m dH , _  m h  d9i _  s _18U1( F ) dF1 
8 H  de0 dH i l(  'de0 8 F  de0 ( '
The Rank-Order Inefficiency in equation (3) is equal to
s u m d j h  _  A_, < p ^ m  (4 8)
H dH i de0 H 8 F  de 0 F de„ K ' 1
and w ith  A >  1, it is decreasing in  the degree of inequality in  the skill 
distribution. ■
7It is our belief tliat the results will not be reversed using the variance definition 
or the Rotlischild-Stiglitz [63] definition for increasing risk as a measure of inequality. 
Mathematical manipulation however is not trivial, especially with the second measure.
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The intuition behind this result is the following. In  a compact distribu­
tion, doubling your type tomorrow through the effort in  the current period, 
ceteris paribus increases your rank considerably. In  a spread out distribution, 
doubling your type changes your rank only marginally. In  the limit case of 
a distribution w ith h(-) —> 0, doubling your type does not change your rank 
at all. The re tu rn  to extra  effort from prom otion (i.e. from increasing the 
rank) is higher the more equal the distribution. As a result, for the marginal 
benefit of effort to  equal the marginal cost, it is rational to  expend more 
effort. Basically, a more equal distribution implies tougher com petition for 
the same jobs. Workers will expend more effort to  obtain those jobs.
From an equity point of view, this is a rather negative result. Efficiency 
can be increased by increasing the spread of the distribution of say education. 
However, promotion or rank has also a distributional effect through the job 
premium.
The J o b  P re m iu m  E ffect. In  analogy w ith  the param eter A above, a 
param eter /3 >  1 can be introduced to  represent an  increase in  the job pre­
mium (3cp. As (3 increases, the effect on consumption of working in a higher 
ranked job increases. Henoe, the wage distribution (i.e. the distribution of 
C) becomes more unequal. The following proposition establishes the result 
related to  the job premium effect.
P ro p o s it io n  12 (Job P re m iu m  E ffec t) Both effort and the Rank-Order 
Inefficiency increase as the job premium increases.
P ro o f . The Rank-Order Inefficiency is equal to
dU, dFi _  dU, dFi 
dF  de0 dc °F de0
j3 >  1 implies
so th a t the Rank-Order Inefficiency increases as the job premium rises. ■
Again, the intuition is straightforward. The higher the marginal benefit 
of being in  the higher job (i.e. the higher /?), the higher the incentive to 
over-invest in effort in the previous period. Clearly, if the marginal-return- 
to-jobs is zero, i.e. the job premium cF =  0, the inefficiency due to  wage 
inequality is zero because jobs are homogeneous. Of course, in th a t case the 
Rank-Order effect is completely switched off. From an efficiency viewpoint, 
there is clearly a welfare gain from reducing the marginal (i.e. w ith  respect 
to jobs) pay-distribution.
The question remains which of the two opposing inequality effects dom­
inates. From a theoretical point of view, the question is answered easily: 
(3\~l 1 implies th a t the increase in  inequality (jointly in the job premium
and in  the distribution of ability) decreases (increases) effort and thus effi­
ciency since the job premium effect dominates (is dominated by) the skill 
distribution effect.
The S kill P re m iu m  E ffect. Finally, there is also the (efficient) effect 
from inequality on the equilibrium effort: the effect of the skill premium 
on the accumulation of hum an and thus on effort. Introducing a param eter 
8 >  1 allows us to  study the effect of an increase in  the skill premium Cq on 
the provision of effort: 8c q . Simple observation of the first-order condition 
(4.10) and Lemma 8 reveals th a t 8c$ increases the equilibrium supply of effort 
as <5 >  1.
Consider now both  the hum an capital effect and the promotion ineffi­
ciency to  work simultaneously. A n increase in  inequality of all sources, i.e. 
A, (3 and 8 >  1, now includes the ambiguous effect of the Rank-Order Ineffi­
ciency on effort and the positive effect on effort from hum an capital invest­
ment. The net effect on effort remains ambiguous. Though empirically there
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is no work th a t distinguishes between the different effects, the literature does 
suggest an  answer for the net effect.
4. The number of hours worked and aggregate inequality are 
correlated
A considerable problem in the empirical wage inequality literature is the 
notion of skill as a supply factor. Even if years of education are taken as a 
proxy, one could argue th a t there are considerable differences between the 
type of education w ithin a country and between countries. The aggregate 
effect of wages however is more tractable. W ithout controlling for skill, the 
distribution of hourly wages captures all three effects on the labour-supply 
decision simultaneously. In  a cross-country comparison, Bell and Freeman 
[9] show a significant fink between the number of hours worked and (hourly) 
earnings inequality, indicating th a t the job and skill premium effects domi­
nate the skill distribution effect.
One final remark on the inequality of the distribution of income. As the 
inefficiency increases, the spread in  the distribution of yearly income (after 
effort) unambiguously increases. The benefit of the higher GDP is not only 
at the cost of higher disutility, it is also a t the cost of equity.
4.4 Comparing Turnover Regimes
In  th is Section, it is analysed in  greater detail how the excess supply of effort 
is sensitive to  different institutional configurations of the labour market. The 
inefficiency is closely related to  the potential upward mobility. The degree of 
mobility obviously depends on the speed at which workers can move up in the 
hierarchy. Therefore, labour markets are compared where these opportunities 
arrive a t a different rate (i.e. markets are characterised by their turnover
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rate). The Rank-Order Inefficiency is then  analysed in function of th is rate 
of turnover. As the inefficiency is explained in function of the incentives of 
future earnings, different turnover rates will yield different inoentive schemes. 
The results are then  taken to  explain two more stylised facts which emphasise 
how the model can account for distinct behaviour between labour markets.
The model is generalised to  the case w ith  infinitely-lived agents and an 
infinitely repeated effort-consumption decision. In  addition, and in order to  
capture the impact of turnover on the equilibrium level of overinvestment, 
the discrete tim e model will be scaled by a factor A, the duration of one 
period. It will allow us to  capture turnover in the job market. If workers 
provide a constant level of effort for their whole fives, their net present value 
of utility will be constant irrespective of A. As the duration of a period 
decreases, the turnover increases. The rate of turnover is th en  defined as 
A -1 . The interpretation is th a t employers allocate workers to  a certain rank 
job based on the currently observed type, which in  th is linear scale factor is 
a function of per unit time effort. Turnover as such has no real technological 
effect,, bu t it affects the incentives for future job opportunities. One final 
remark, in th is Section the human capital effect will be made redundant, 
i.e. ce =  0. Controlling for the promotion incentive effect, hum an capital 
accumulation can reasonably be assumed independent of mobility. W ithout 
loss of generality, it is assumed there is no hum an capital a t all. The stage 
game becomes:
max pAtA[£/(Ct) -  et]
As in Section three, the social planner’s problem can be reduced to  finding 
the allocation which maximises the sum of utilities. Moreover, since c# =  0, 
the solution (e f ,C ° ,9 )  is identical in every period and satisfies
£ =i ’v*
Note th a t the first-order condition in  the presence of th is linear scale factor 
is independent of A.
The decentralised Subgame Perfect Equilibrium solution now not only 
takes into account next period, bu t the discounted sum of the effect in  each 
future period. The reason is th a t current effort has an  effect on next pe­
riod’s type, and under the Single Crossing condition, next period’s type has 
a positive effect on the type two periods ahead: gde >  0 and gQ >  0. Henoe, 
current effort has a positive effect on the rank and the consumption two pe­
riods from now. This is true for all future periods, appropriately discounted. 
In the decentralised outcome the first-order condition is
^  +  =  (4-13)det “  det
The results from the former Section generalise to  this model. The Rank- 
Order Inefficiency is still positive Vs >  1, since ge > 0 .  As a result, also 
in the generalised case, effort is super-optimal. Note th a t the extra effort 
is not ’’technologically” related to  the rate of turnover bu t to  the change 
in incentives. The model is specified such tha t, given identical provision of 
effort under different promotion regimes, the net present value of utility  is 
constant. However, if incentives are affected by the A, effort provision differs 
depending on the promotion regime because incentives are affected. The way 
in which effort is affected is the purpose of Proposition 13.
P ro p o s it io n  13 For discount rates 0 <  p < the (inefficient) supply of
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effort is monotonically increasing in the rate of turnover.
P ro o f. From applying the implicit function theorem to  the first-order con­
dition (4.13), it follows th a t
In , £ ^ * 3 3 * 1
S  =---- ^-- 3UIC~  < 0 (414)
5A £4e +  Es=l
since U and g are concave in e and w ith 0 < p <  1. As a result et is decreasing 
in A, implying it is increasing in A -1 , the rate of turnover. ■
C o ro lla ry  7 (N o T u rn o ver  R eg im e) As A —» oo; the decentralised solu­
tion is equal to first-best.
(P e rm a n e n t T u rn o ver  R eg im e) As A  —> 0, the inefficiency is max­
imised.
P ro o f. Immediate from Proposition 13 and equation (4.13). ■
In order to gain some intuition behind Proposition 13, consider the fol­
lowing thought experiment. Compare two Turnover Regimes: A  is one year 
(i.e. high t.mnover) versus A is ten years (low turnover). In  the high turnover 
regime, extra effort is provided only during one year rather th an  10 years, so 
the marginal cost of providing extra effort is scaled by A  =  1. Certainly, also 
the benefit from extra effort only lasts for one year rather th an  10 years, so 
the benefit, as well is scaled by A. The difference between the two regimes lies 
in the discoimting. Providing 10 years of effort now to benefit from it only 
in the next period of ten years definitely has a lower net present value th an  
in the case of one year. As a result, discounting makes the difference. This is 
apparent from equation (4.13), where A enters the first-order condition only 
in the discount factor pAs. W ith no discounting, the intertem poral price of
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utilitv is 1 and agents value current and future utility equally. In  th a t case, 
tip a is no incentive ('fleet due to the Turnover Regime. This is confirmed by 
ijii.it i mi ; I I I i :  I n  1 = 0 . implying tha t ^  =  0. In case agents are myopic 
i • . /; — ()!. the Rank-Order Inefficiency (equation (4.13)) is equal to  zero 
-mum it is multiplied In zero. Basically, agents are not forward looking and 
In ■ 111 'i -job" incentives do not affect ciurent effort.
It f ill >w s  f i i*ni P i o p o s i t i o n s  13 and Corollary 7 th a t as turnover increases, 
111ii< • mi il i n g s  i unease since m o r e  effort, generates more consumption. 
\ _  mi .  t i n  , . \ t i a  c o n s u m p t i o n  g o e s  at the cost of too much effort.
In w hat follow s,  two stvlised facts are discussed which indicate some dif- 
'• e i n' s  between (litfeieiit lahotu markets.
A inei ican la b o u r m ar k e ts  e x h ib it a  h ig h e r tu rn o v e r  r a te  th a n  
C.i i m an m a rk e ts
I *p' I a n d  W a i d  [7'J] foi  t h e  U S  a n d  Acemoghr and Pischke [l] for both  
tip l "s  a n d  ( h i  11 i a  n \ u s e  d a t a  o n  j o b  mobility to calculate rates of turnover, 
i 11' h u d  i n t e s  t h a t  a m  t w i c e  a s  l i i g h  i n the U S  compared to  Germany. 
( Mi .;d' ime tin novel a s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  feat me. this could be a ttribu ted  
i ih'  d e e  ' o f  i f  i ' e. n I a t i o  n . G i v e n  that .  American and German labour 
m e ' :  t ■ " hi hi r  a s i g i  l i h e a n t  Iv d i f i e i e n t  Prom otion Regime, this stylised fact 
ei  I. n - d t - \ ei  if\  t i c h\  p o t h e s i s  i n  Proposition 13.  The next stylised fact
P • ,<h - th' ii' o, s s a i  \ i nf oi  m a t i o n  on effort, provision in both  countries for
i : . .  ■ ; ; * i 1 1 1  > 1 1 .
( e  A n n  i i c a n s  w ork longer h o u rs  th a n  G e rm a n s  
in i : > - • ■ o m i t  i e , , n i p a i  i s o n .  i n particular between the U S  and Ger- 
. ,! in . !!■ !I a n d  I t< ■< m a n  !h| c o n f i m i  Fact 1 above, i.e. basic supply factors 
I ' p. e n  d ifh n n o  s  m  l a h o i u  i na i  ket behaviour. In addition they claim
t'i : mri  ' Ha m f M d< • n i o g i a p h i c s .  preferences and average wage and
!()<>
income, there is still a difference of 15% in hours worked to  be explained. 
O n average, out of six days, Americans work one day extra compared to  
Germans. Together w ith  Fact 5, this confirms our hypothesis th a t effort and 
turnover are positively correlated.
4.5 Extension: Life Cycle
The analysis of ”better-job” opportunities so far may seem slightly odd. 
In  equilibrium, the rank of the distribution is maintained (Corollary 6), so 
th a t effectively, there is no better jobs are ever obtained a t all. At the 
same time however, the individual’s tem ptation to  outwit the higher types 
in her neighbourhood does cause the inefficiency. Because all individuals try  
to  outwit each other and given the Single Crossing condition, there is no 
effective change in the rank. Trivially, imperfect observability would induce 
changes in  the rank but still, ex-ante the distribution would m aintain rank. 
The mere introduction of a life-cycle story w ith  overlapping generations yields 
the observed effective movement between jobs.
Consider the two-period model in  Section Three, bu t now w ith  overlap­
ping generations. Young individuals are born a t t  =  0, and work in  this 
period. A t t  =  1, old individuals work and die. The difference is th a t a t 
the moment a young individual enters the economy, half the population is 
old. The inflow distribution of young types, F Y (9) is exogenous, and its 
population has mass one half. The distribution of old individuals F °(9)  is 
endogenous and is a function of the effort expended by last period’s young 
workers, the currently old ones. As a result, the effective type distribution 
observed a t any moment in tim e is F(9) =  | F Y(9) +  \F ° {9 ) . If g(e,9) >  9 , 
then  an old worker born of type 9 is more productive th an  a young person
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born of the same type 9. I t  is easy to  verify th a t effectively all workers will get 
a better job. Older individuals will move up the ladder. The young people 
th a t enter w ith  the same type as the currently old ones did when they were 
young are now lower down the rank. However, from the results in  Section 
Three, it follows not only th a t there will be over-investment in  effort, bu t also 
th a t between people of the same age, the rank is maintained. D istributions 
F ty (9) and FJJ.^9) m aintain the rank. The promotion behaviour th a t is ob­
served is between cohorts, bu t the w ithin cohort ranking contributes to  the 
inefficiency. This is supported by research on the explanation of inequality 
in the UK. Gosling, Machin and Mehir [29] find th a t inequality can nearly 
entirely be explained w ithin rather th an  between cohorts.
Consider further another life-cycle consideration. The extended model in 
Section Four gives some additional insights into the effort decision of finitely 
lived agents. Recall from Section Two th a t in  the two-period model, there 
is no investment in the last period. In  general, for a fixed period model (T  
periods), effort is decreasing as tim e increases. In  the last period, effort is a t 
the optim al level.
P ro p o s it io n  14 For a finitely lived agent, the excess supply of effort de­
creases over time
P ro o f . The first-order condition for the T  period model becomes
itive term s in  the Rank-Order Inefficiency decreases. From Proposition 10,
(4.15)
It follows directly from this equation th a t as t  increases, the number of pos-
effort is positively related to  the Rank-Order Inefficiency. As a result, ef­
fort will decrease over time. In  the last period, the Rank-Order Inefficiency
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term  is equal to  zero, thus yielding the first-order condition for the  social 
optimum. ■
This result can explain the following stylised fact w ithin labour markets.
7. Hours decrease w ith age
Controlling now for differences between professions (e.g. self employed 
versus public sector) and skill, workers a t a later stage of their career work 
less hours. In  measuring productivity of different age groups, Medoff and 
Abraham  [43] find th a t w ithin job types, young workers produce more output 
th an  older workers of similar ability. This indicates th a t, given ability is 
related w ithin the job type, younger workers supply more labour th an  older 
workers.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In  an attem pt to  explain the effort supply decision of workers, it has been 
shown th a t the future career opportunities can have considerable effects on 
the hours of work. In  part, th is is efficient in a hum an capital context: the 
extra effort is an  investment in  the ability of the worker. However, if the 
premise is accepted th a t there exists a distribution of jobs w ith  different pro­
ductivity, the productivity of a worker is not merely depending on ability, bu t 
also on allocation of the worker to  the job. Since in equilbrium the allocation 
depends on the rank of the worker, effort becomes a tool to  achieve higher 
ranked jobs. I t  is shown th a t the  extra supply of effort is inefficient since 
rank is a zero sum game. Moreover, the inefficiency increases as turnover 
increases. O n the  other hand, the theoretical effect of inequality on effort 
is ambiguous. A more unequal distribution of skills decreases bo th  effort 
and inefficiency, whereas a rise in  the job premium increases them. A rise in
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the skill premium increases effort bu t is efficient. The theoretical results are 
supported by seven stylised facts from the empirical labour-supply literature.
In  the presence of a Rank-Order effect, there are some im portant wel­
fare implications. One implication relates to  the importance of GDP as an 
indicator of welfare. Simple observation of a general equilibrium economy 
(Edgeworth box) shows th a t maximising GDP is equivalent to  maximising 
the u tilitarian  social welfare function if and only if the marginal utilities of all 
individuals are equal in equilibrium. However, redistribution (whether it is 
through lump sum taxes or marginal taxes) involves a Pareto deterioration of 
the richer individuals. In  the inefficient outcome of our equilibrium, output is 
higher th a n  in the social optimum. The inefficiency is due to  the over-supply 
of hours. Hence, the economy maximises GDP bu t not to ta l u tilitarian  wel­
fare. Contrary to  the Edgeworth economy, in th is production economy there 
exists a welfare improving allocation which is Pareto Superior. There exists a 
Pigouvian tax  rate for all workers, equal to  the Rank-O rder Inefficiency, th a t 
would improve overall welfare and no individual would be worse off. GDP on 
the contrary would decline. The relevant measure for comparison between 
countries is then  not yearly GDP, bu t hourly GDP, since th a t corrects for the 
differences in effort. Provided of course th a t the preferences between different 
countries are identical. Bell and Freeman [9] report th a t according to  such a 
purely utilitarian  criterion, Germans comfortably lead over Americans, even 
though GDP per capita in the US is higher. Further, in the presence of this 
Pareto Superior tax  schedule, Mirrlees’ optim al taxation  problem is no t as 
dram atic as it seems. Even if the government cannot monitor the types of 
the workers, there exists one implementable tax  schedule (i.e. the  Pigouvian 
tax schedule) which is first best. Finally, one cannot argue th a t our analysis 
does not take into account the effect of more hours on the productivity of
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the firm, since this is embodied in  the production function. Under perfect 
competition, all the firms’ potential benefits accrue to  the workers.
To conclude, one remark on our approach of modelling the labour market 
in a dynamic framework and in  the presence of a matching game. Combined 
w ith vertical heterogeneity, it yields a result th a t is analogous to  the results in  
the signalling literature. By the same token, th is approach can be extended 
to  the whole static  imperfect information literature. Efficiency wage mod­
els for example, are often used to  explain unemployment. However, rather 
th an  the fear of being caught shirking, this fear may be interpreted as the 
fear of losing the job. Even w ith  a wage rate th a t is flat w ithin  one period, 
workers put in effort, because they know th a t next period’s wage (unemploy­
ment versus the same wage) depends on the current period’s effort. In  this 
dynamic context there is no asymmetry in information between worker and 
firm. The comforting result of the analogy is tha t, as shown in  th is paper, 
the results of several imperfect information models can be extended to  full 
information models w ith Repeated Tournament features. Those seemingly 
equivalent results however are derived from allocation externalities, rather 
th an  information externalities. As a result, the understanding of the mech­
anisms generating those outcomes differs dramatically.
I l l
4.7 Appendix
P ro p o s it io n  9
P ro o f. The first-order condition (4.5) is a necessary condition for the equi­
librium to  exist. In  addition, the second-order condition needs to  be verified. 
The proof of the first condition of our Proposition (i.e. the sufficiency of Sin­
gle Crossing) is based upon Spence [70, Proposition 1]. The second derivative 
has to  satisfy,
d2U0 d?Ui „
& r + ^ < 0  (A 41)
In  a Subgame Perfect equilibrium (i.e. taking the optim al strategy of all 
other players as given), there is the indirect effect of e0 on the rank F (9\) of 
current period’s type 90. Differentiating (4.5) then  yields:
d?U0 f U i  dCj & g 9eo
, 2 P j 2 a  — 0 (A4.2)deo dezQ dFi d00de0 g9o
For the second-order condition (A l) to  be satisfied, it is sufficient th a t
W ^ w t ~ >0 (A4.3)oF1 d@ode0 g9o
Given the restrictions on the functional forms above, th is implies th a t the 
sufficient condition requires Single Crossing to  be satisfied: >  0. Ob­
servation of (A4.3) in addition shows th a t continuity of F  is sufficient (con­
dition 2 in the Proposition). If th is is not satisfied, the density function /  
may not exist or be zero, thus violating (A4.3).
In  general, like the signalling equilibrium w ith  continuous agents (Spence 
[70]), this equilibrium is not unique: integrating (4.5) gives a solution subject
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to  a constant. However, each of the multiple equilibria exists provided th a t 
for all agents there exists a constant such th a t the  solution to  (4.5) is feasible. 
T ha t is, as long as the marginal benefit from prom otion exceeds the marginal 
cost. Because it is assumed th a t for the lowest types the marginal benefit 
is zero, i.e. Cf (0 =  0) =  0, a t least some types have only one solution th a t 
is feasible (i.e. where the constant is zero). Since it is no longer the case 
th a t all agents have a feasible pay-off w ith  a non-zero constant, all other 
equilibria do not exist. ■
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Chapter 5
Educational M obility: The 
Effect on Efficiency and  
D istribution
The whole literature following the emergenoe of endogenous growth theory 
has argued th a t externalities in  the accumulation process are of considerable 
importance to  explain different growth experiences. Romer [59] discusses 
the effect on the accumulation of physical capital and Lucas [38] considers 
externalities in  the acquisition of hum an capital. The idea in  all of this 
work is th a t the individual returns to  investment are not necessarily equal 
to  the social returns. Aghion and Howitt [2] and Grossman and Helpman 
[30] have followed this up by looking more in  detail a t the innovation pro­
cess of technology. They provide micro foundations for the externality th a t 
arises in the upgrading and advance of technology. Parallel to  this strand 
of the literature, work has been done on the externalities th a t arise in the 
accumulation process of hum an capital. Most recently, Benabou [ll] looks 
a t spillovers in  the education technology and its effect on the incentives to
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acquire hum an capital. W ith  agents characterised by heterogeneous w ealth 
holdings, it is argued th a t the education technology is not only characterised 
by the individual level of investment but also by the social level of invest­
ment, i.e. the aggregate of all individual levels. W ith  agents heterogeneous 
in wealth levels, other approaches have been taken to  study the im pact of ac­
cumulation of hum an (and physical) capital in  the presence of capital m arket 
imperfections: Banerjee and Newman [6], Galor and Zeira [28] and P iketty  
[55]. The initial wealth level can impose a constraint on the level of optim al 
investment in the presence of imperfect information, thus leading to  the per­
sistence in inequalities. Though the level of wealth certainly is an  im portant 
determ inant in investment opportunities, hum an capital accumulation and 
education is definitely also affected by the productive ability of agents in the 
labour market.
This paper proposes a fine of research th a t s ta rts  from the premise th a t 
agents are heterogeneous in their ability or skill level rather th a n  in  their 
wealth holdings. Certainly, over the life cycle, ability and w ealth may well be 
correlated, bu t the mechanism through which ability affects the accumulation 
of hum an capital is of a different nature. This has also been recognised by 
A rnott and Rowse [4]. Their approach is similar to  th a t of Benabou [11] 
in the sense th a t they study a t the external effect of mixing heterogeneous 
agents in the education technology. However, rather th a n  in wealth, they 
consider heterogeneity in ability. The second feature in  which our approach 
differs from the literature above is th a t it is recognised th a t the external effect 
does not arise as such in  the process of education, bu t in  the production in 
the presence of heterogeneous agents. In  th a t respect, our approach is in  
line w ith Eicher [20] who looks a t the interaction between the production 
technology (with externalities) and the incentives to  invest in  education.
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Human capital is endogenous and the interaction is modelled as affecting 
technological change. In  th a t respect, there is no ex ante heterogeneity of 
agents so th a t it is impossible to  study how individual heterogeneous agents 
behave. This is exactly the objective of providing micro foundations for the 
rationale of economy wide accumulation of hum an capital.
In  this paper, a labour market w ith  agents of different ability is mod­
elled explicitly. They produce vertically differentiated goods (in quality) in  
separate production industries of the economy. The value of the  output is 
a function of the ability of the workers. The production externality arises 
from the fact th a t these industries are monopolistically competitive. In­
dustries are modelled in  the fashion of M arkusen [40] and K rugm an and 
Venables [35]. The vertically differentiated goods are imperfect substitutes 
in consumption. As in the utility of consumers in  ’’The Economics of Su­
perstars” (Rosen [60]), individuals are indifferent between the consumption 
of different quality goods as long as they are appropriately compensated in 
quantity. Consumption can then  be expressed in  term s of efficiency units. 
W ithin this framework, the presence of a constant returns to  scale education 
technology allows for mobility of individuals between different skill classes. 
The private incentives for investment however do not take into account the 
external industry wide effect. If a group of workers augment their skills, the 
size distribution of skills changes the initial exogenous distribution. W ith  a 
monopolistically competitive production technology, the outpu t per head is 
higher in a larger industry. This entirely captures the positive externality 
th a t exists from mobility of low skilled workers into higher ability jobs.
In  the next Section, the economy and its population are described in  detail 
and the general equilibrium outcome without mobility is derived. Modelling 
this micro behaviour in detail involves some inevitable algebra. Section 5.2
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discusses the impact of mobility. I t  is shown th a t multiple equilibria can 
exist for a certain range of skill differentials. A part from a coordination issue, 
there is also a problem of free riding which can result in  Pareto improvements 
by subsidising education of the lower skilled people. W ithout subsidy, the 
cost of investment is higher th an  the private return, so th a t no investment 
occurs. However, the high types benefit from their mobility, so they would 
be better off if they can induce low types to  invest. In  Section 5.3, the 
game is played repeatedly. This allows us to  consider the effect of growth. 
Though th is paper does not pretend to  provide a theory of growth, w ith  
endogenous accumulation of hum an capital, the growth rate will depend on 
the distribution of skills and thus on education. The relation between equity 
and efficiency will be identified. In  the tradition  of the  literature on ergodic 
distributions in  the presenoe of capital market imperfections, the limiting 
distribution of bo th  w ealth and ability can be related to  the growth of the 
economy. A sufficient condition is derived for which there is polarisation, i.e. 
ever increasing inequality. Some Concluding Rem arks are made in Section 
5.4.
5.1 The Basic M odel
The economy is populated w ith heterogeneous individuals characterised by a 
type q. There are a finite number of n  types indexed by i  =  1 ...n. Initially, 
they are distributed according to the densisty 4>(qi) and the size of the whole 
population is normalised to  one, =  1- Individuals are bo th  producers 
and consumers and the type of an  agent is interpreted as her productive 
ability or level of skill as a worker. The higher <&, the  more productive.
Workers produoe in order to  derive utility from consumption. To formalise
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the notion of less th a n  perfect substitutability of labour, it will be assumed 
th a t workers of a certain type will only work in the same industry as workers 
of the same type. A n industry can then  be characterised by the type of its 
characteristic worker qi w ith  production in n  parallel industries. In  term s 
of the quantity produced in  the different industries, technology is identical 
for industries of the same size. However, workers w ith  higher skill levels 
will produce higher quality goods. Though the quantity produced in  two 
industries may be identical, the value will differ depending on the level of 
skills of its workers.
W ith  technology of the quantity produced identical for all industries, 
we can specify the technology of a generic industry given its  size 0 . As 
mentioned in  the introduction, a monopolistically competitive technology 
is assumed which will incorporate spillover effects a t the production level. 
The production process is modelled following M arkusen [40], allowing for 
free entry and a zero profit condition. Each industry is characterised by a 
sector of diversified input goods and an output sector. A worker of a certain 
industry can either work in the input or the output sector.
The input sector exhibits increasing returns and the  output sector con­
stan t returns. Hence, the industry as a whole has an  increasing returns 
technology. In  any industry, L  6 [0,0] of the workers will work in  the output 
sector. The other <f> — L  will work in the increasing returns to  scale input 
sector, which consists of a number of equally sized firms, producing some va­
riety r  of the input good, in a monopolistically competitive environment. The 
more varieties, the greater the quantity of the composite input X  good which 
is used in  production of the output. This technology is as in  Dixit-Stiglitz
where cr(> 1) is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between the different 
variety inputs. Every xr, the quantity of variety r  of the input, is produced 
w ith  increasing returns to  scale: sr =  a  4- /3xr, where s r is the amount of 
labour used in th a t firm. I t  now follows th a t the am ount of the  composite 
input produced is convex in  the number of workers in  the input sector, <j) — L .
The outpu t sector exhibits constant returns, the technology of which is:
Y  =  LeX l~e, where Y  is the quantity produced. I t  follows th a t the output
Y  of the industry as a whole is convex in  the number of workers <p.
We solve the problem for a given industry of size <fi:
X  1 - 0  w /r x
L ’  — ^  <5 2»
t f x 1-* - u L -  px x  =  0 (5.3)
Pr =  — (5. 4)
<7 —  1
(5.5)
Equation (5.2) is the profit maximisation condition in the output sector, w ith 
Px the price of the composite input and lj is the wage (in term s of units of 
production) in the industry. In  the presence of free entry, the zero profit 
condition is given by (5.3). In  the input sector, each of the diversified firms r  
maximises profits (equation (5.4)) w ith  (5.5) the zero profit condition. This 
allows us to  calculate the number of firms m  in  the sector, each producing 
the same amount xr:
(5.6)
acr
Because of the increasing returns in  the production of the composite input 
and typically for this Dixit-Stiglitz type of technology, the price pr will for
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???, >  1 be higher th an  the price index faoed by the ou tpu t producers1:
P x  =  m ^ p r
1, . , \ Y*— (5-7)
after substitution for (5.4) and (5.6). Finally, market clearing implies:
=  i f X 1' 6 (5.8)
Equations (5.2), (5.3), (5.7) and (5.8) are independent and contain four un­
knowns: cj, px , L  and X .
The preferences of individuals over the goods produced in each individual 
industry depend on the quality of the good produced and hence on the level 
of skills of the workers. The quality of a good will simply be indexed by 
q. As a result, n  types of goods will be produced w ith  quality w ith  
q\ <  qi <  ... <  qn. Agents all have identical preferences independent of 
their type. U tility is increasing in bo th  quality q and the quantity consumed 
Yq. They perfectly substitute quantity for quality. A n equalising difference 
unit can then  be defined as cq =  qYq. This specification is as in Rosen [60]. 
This implies th a t one unit of the higher quality good is preferred above one 
unit of the lower quality good. It also follows th a t consumers are indifferent 
between one unit of a quality q good and two units of a quality q/2  good. 
As a result, even though different quality goods are not perfect substitutes, 
equalising difference units are. The to ta l consumption C  can thus be w ritten  
as the sum of all cq. The utility derived from consumption of C  is U  =  C. 
Individuals are risk neutral.
1This transition mechanism through the price is the trick of the Dixit-Stiglitz [19] 
model. Since there is a ’taste’ for variety in inputs, the nominal value pr of an input is 
higher than the real value px• The more variety (i.e. the higher m), the lower the real 
value of the input.
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From the substitutability of the equalising difference units, it follows th a t 
individuals will value one unit of a good q twice as high as one unit of a good 
q/2. In  general, consumers will equate the marginal rate of substitution, 
qi/qj to  the  price ratio of different quality goods. If good qi — 1 is taken  as 
the numeraire good, prices satisfy
p„ =  q (5.9)
From equation (5.9), we know th a t the value of the  output for industries 
w ith  the same number of workers will be in  exact proportion to  the relative 
quality levels. As a result, the value of the output of an  industry q can be 
w ritten  as qYq. In  addition, the wages between different industries can be 
compared. Each worker in an industry receives a wage equal to  the value of 
the quantity w(0) of th a t industry’s goods. Hence, w ith  different values of 
goods (equation (5.9)), the m onetary wages will be given by
wq((/>) =  qu(<j)) (5.10)
The advantage of the specified preferences and the production technology is 
th a t, though wages depend on the size of the industry, the  quality or skill 
impact is separable.
W ithin th is framework, the actions of an individual are the choice of the 
level of education. Costly education will enable her to  increase her level of 
hum an capital, given an initial endowment of skills. This is beneficial since 
th a t allows her to  produce a higher quality good and hence she will receive 
a higher price for her labour. The cost of education is increasing in  the 
level a t which skills are augmented and it depends on the initial skill level
q. In  general, the cost of education is given by the separable cost function
To ensure existence, the following restrictions are imposed: / (A )  is strictly 
convex ( / a a  >  0), / a  > 0 , / a (0) =  0 , / a ( o o ) =  oo and / ( 0) =  0 . Investment 
in general depends on the initial level of skills, but the returns to  skill are 
assumed constant. Individuals will choose the level of education A  in  order 
to  maximise utility, taking the strategy of all other players as given. A n 
equilibrium will then  be a rule such th a t each individual chooses an  optim al 
strategy taking into account the optim al strategy of all other players.
5.2 The Results
W ith  the production sector specified above, it is crucial how the wage is 
affected by the size of the workforce in the industry. W ith  a monopolistically 
competitive production industry, there will certainly be a positive effect of 
cf) on the quantity of output produced. Simultaneously, from the fact th a t 
there is free entry, profits are driven to  zero and the entire outpu t accrues 
to the workers in this general competitive equilibrium context. In  addition, 
not only is the quantity produced increasing in the size of the industry, the 
value of the wage is increasing. This is shown in the following Lemma.
L em m a 7 The wage in any industry is increasing in the size of the industry
g > 0  (5.12)
P ro o f . See Appendix. ■
This entirely captures the notion of external effects in  the production 
technology. Though the education technology will not inherently exhibit any 
external effect, the returns to  education are affected by the wage. Henoe, 
since the wage depends on the degree of mobility (which is a synonym for
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education in th is context), the decision of an  individual to  invest will depend 
on the level of investment of the others.
Consider the simplest possible case of a two period game w ith  two types 
qi (low) and q2 (high). In  the first period of the game, all <pi (in the two 
industry case, set (ft2 =  0  > hence <0i =  1 — 0 ) types q\ can choose between 
two strategies: I. Invest in  education a t cost F (A, qi)2 in  order to  achieve a 
level of hum an capital q2; In  the  second period, the q\ type will be able to 
work in  the q2 quality industry and receive w2\ N I. No Investment and work 
in the low quality production industry for the second period.
Note th a t in (5.11), A  is defined as the gap between the quality (or skill) 
levels of the two industries. Since the cost of investment function is increasing 
in its argum ent A, the re tu rn  on investment must be a function of the gap 
A. The re tu rn  on investment behaves as in figure 5.13.
The re tu rn  on investment function Vq can be defined as VQ =  <7(1 +  
A)c^(-) — R F (A , q)4. For the simplest case, where a qi type decides not to 
invest, i.e. play strategy N I, the return  on investment function is indepen­
dent of A  because there is no cost. In  the figure, th is is represented by the 
horizontal line N I. The wage received is the current wage in industry 1, 
W\ =  #1^(1 — 0). If a low type decides to  play I, the  re tu rn  on investment 
depends on the behaviour of the other low types. The reason is th a t, as a 
result of the increasing returns, the wage is an increasing function of the size 
of the industry (Lemma 7). This implies a positive effect on the  wage in
2Capital markets are perfect, so investment can be paid for by borrowed money and
will be repaid at rate R =  1+ interest rate.
3 Figure 1 is a mapping of A into the return on investment function for given densities
{01? 02} (the figure is drawn for 0 i <  02 ). As is defined as the relative gap between q2
and q\ , the function indicates what happens in case of changing inequality.
4Note that q\{\ +  A)w(*) =  q2<^ (')-
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case 3 case 2case 1
Figure 5.1: Cases with Different Equilibria
industry 2 when q\ types decide to invest, i.e. the externality from mobility. 
Now, two extreme situations can be considered. First, all the q\ types decide 
to invest, so the size of the new qy industry is 0i +  02 =  1* The return  on 
investment is 1(1): 92^(1) — R F (A, q). Second, if none of the other low types 
decides to invest, the size of the q2 industry does not change and the return 
on investment for a low type is 1(0): q ^  (0) — R F (A ,  q), which is always 
lower than  in the first situation.
The equilibrium strategies chosen by the q\ types can now be analysed 
given an initial distribution, i.e. given {<?i, <?2 } and {1 — 0 ,0} . Given the 
returns Vq for the strategies 1(0), 1(1) and N I and depending on the gap 
between the two types, there are three different cases:
CASE 1. <72^(0) ~  R F (A ,q i)  > q \u (\ — 0): unique Dominant Strategy 
equilibrium
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The equilibrium strategy for all 1 — 0  types will be I. The motives are 
obvious: the disparity between the hum an capital levels - and hence the cost 
of investment F  - is so low th a t they are better off when earning the high 
wage, irrespective of the strategies of the other q2 types.
CASE 2. q2u ( \ ) - R F ( A, f t)  <  qiu;(0): unique Dom inant Strategy equilib­
rium
The equilibrium strategy for all q\ types will be NI. They do not invest, 
because the wage in the q\ industry is higher th an  the wage in  q2 net of 
the cost of investment, even if all other low types would invest. Sinoe the 
disparity between the different levels of hum an capital is so high, the cost of 
investment cannot be compensated by the gain in wage.
CASE 3. q2u;((j)) — R F (A ,q 1) <  qiu>(\ — (f>) and qi<*>(0) <  q2c j( l )—R F (A ,q 1) 
multiple Nash equilibria
For A  in th is region there are: 1. a pure strategy equilibrium I for all 
types qi',2. a pure strategy equilibrium N I for all types q ,^ and 3. a mixed 
strategy equilibrium5 where all types q\ are indifferent between I and NI. 
Each worker plays I w ith probability p =  p*, where
p* G {p  € (0 ,1) : qiUJ (<f> + p( 1 -  <j>)) -  RF(A, g,) = ((1 -  p)(l -  <j>))
(5.13)
The mixed strategy equilibrium is unstable because the slightest deviation 
leads to  either one of the stable pure strategy equilibria (see also figure 5.2). 
Ex ante, the equilibria are Pareto ranked as follows: 1. all choose I; 2. all
5Tliis mixed strategy equilibrium can analogously be interpreted as a pure strategy 
equilbrium where a fraction p decide to invest. At that point, a q\ type is indifferent 
between I and NI.
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Figure 5.2: Multiple Nash Equilibria
choose N I; 3. mixed strategy equilibrium. The mixed strategy equilibrium 
is inferior because Wi =  q^ uj ((1 — p)( 1 — (p)) is increasing in 1 — cp: as the 
industry becomes smaller, the wage drops (Lemma 7), i.e. if only a fraction 
of the workers increase their hum an capital, there is a negative externality 
on the workers remaining immobile6.
Let us now consider some of the welfare implications. Case 3 illustrates 
th a t there is a serious problem of coordination failure. All workers choosing 
I  is Pareto optimal, bu t the emergence of th is equilibrium depends on the 
beliefs of all the other workers. There is a role for the government to  improve 
coordination. Legislation th a t makes education m andatory up to  a certain 
age can be interpreted as one such an  example of coordinating action.
6Ex post, 1(1) dominates both the other equilibria. The equilibria all N I and the mixed 
strategy can not be Pareto ranked however, because in the mixed strategy equilbrium, a 
fraction p will be better off than in the all N I while a fraction 1 — p are worse off.
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R e m a rk  7  P e r fe c t co o rd in a tio n  w ith in  on e  in d u s try . For the re­
mainder of the paper, we will concentrate on the more interesting equilibria 
where no such coordination failure within an industry exists. Workers in 
different industries have different objectives. However, the interests within 
industries are identical for all workers. One way to think about this is that 
all workers are represented by a guild and decision are made collectively. 
As a result, there is no coordination failure within groups of workers of the 
same type. In terms of figure 5.1, this implies that only the highest curve, 
#2^ ( 1) — R F (A, qi), is taken into consideration. For what concerns the equi­
librium strategy, the upper envelope of both the latter and the N I curve will 
be chosen.
After abstracting from the problems of coordination failure, one very 
substantial welfare issue remains. The game is designed such th a t only the 
lower hum an capital types choose a strategy. The higher types rem ain idle in  
the first stage. However, because of the externality due to  increasing returns, 
mobility of the low types will have an effect on the wage of the high types 
and thus on their utility. Closer inspection of the externality shows th a t 
in fact, the low, mobile types do not receive the marginal product of their 
entry into the  higher quality industry, bu t the average product, which is 
lower th a n  the  marginal product. Since the higher types receive the average 
product as well, they benefit unequivocally from entry by the  low types. 
There will be a case for a Pareto improving subsidy S. Two conditions have 
to  be satisfied: 1. case 2 must apply (i.e. ^2^ ( 1) — R F {A ,q i)  <  qi^(O) 
so th a t w ithout subsidy, N I is the equilibrium strategy. This condition is 
fulfilled for A  >  A 2. As a result, there will be no positive externality on the 
high types; 2. the subsidy must be large enough to  induce the low types to  
make the investment: ^ w (l)  — R F (A , q\) +  5(1 — =  qiw(O). This in fact
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implies th a t the high types give the minimum subsidy S, necessary to  achieve 
investment. There will obviously be an  upper bound to  the amount the high 
types are willing to  subsidise. Smax is defined as the subsidy which makes 
the higher types indifferent between subsidising education w ith  the induced 
mobility (and henoe w ith  the resulting higher wage) and not subsidising
Sm ax =  0  (q2v (  1 )  -  9 2 ^ ( 0 ) )  ( 5 .1 4 )
In  fact, Smax is the  to ta l value of the pure economic rent. I t  follows th a t only 
for S  G [0, Smax], Pareto improvements are possible. In  term s of A, we can 
establish th a t Pareto  improvements are possible for A  G [A2, A3], where A 3 
is defined as
A3 6  {A  6 1) -  R F (A, 9l) +  S ^ l  -  0 ) " 1 =  9lw(0)} (5.15)
Since the external effect has an industry wide impact, it is crucial th a t the 
effort of the high types to  provide additional incentives to  the low types 
is coordinated. There is indeed a serious free rider problem which is not 
necessarily ruled out under the assum ption of coordination w ithin industry, 
but which cannot avoid deviation when there are incentives to  do so. As a 
result, there will be a role for the government to  impose a tax  on the q2 types 
and to  subsidize education of the q\ types if A  is in the relevant interval.
5.3 The repeated game
The point of interest in th is section is how the distribution evolves over time 
and how mobility can have an impact on both  the distribution and efficiency. 
In  other words, an  underlying theory of growth is needed. However, because 
this paper does not claim to  be able to  explain growth, the analysis will be 
limited to  the case of an economy growing a t a constant rate. Education
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will be the sole motor behind growth. I t  is therefore essential th a t now all 
types, also the highest types, have access to  th is investment in  education 
technology.
Consider the two period game from section 5.1 (for now still w ith  two 
types: n  =  2), which is repeated in a successive generations model where ev­
ery parent gives b irth  to one child a t the end of the second period. M onetary 
bequests are left out of the analysis, because capital markets are assumed 
to  be perfect and as a result there will be no effect of the distribution of 
w ealth on the investment opportunities. Children inherit the hum an capital 
which the parent has accumulated in  the second period of her generation. I t  
follows th a t  human capital is inheritable and accumulatable and as a result, 
the distribution of hum an capital a t the end of one generation is reproduced 
a t the beginning of the next generation.
In  th is framework w ith  growth, bo th  high types and low types will invest 
in education, irrespective of the mobility issue. A bstracting for the moment 
from the possibility of mobility, the problem for a type q will be to  choose the 
am ount of investment in education such tha t: A* E argmax{wq)t+i(0 (q), A )— 
i£F(A , q)} =  {q(l +  A)cj((j)(q)) —R F (A, #)}. In  general, the optim al am ount 
of investment is given:
A* =  (5.16)
W ith  F  separable and w ith  the cost constant w ith  respect to  skills (F( A, q) =  
/(A )q ), A* will be independent of q
=  (5-17) 
The intu ition  behind th is investment technology is the following. As A  is a 
measure for the gap between two levels of hum an capital - q after investment 
in  education and q a t the beginning of period one, i.e. the initial level of hu­
m an capital - A* is the optim al amount by which to  augment the level of skill
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q. At the same time, A (see equation (5.11)) is a measure for a percentage 
increase in the initial human capital and hence the outcome after investment 
depends upon the initial level of human capital q. In  other words, though the 
optimal amount of investment is independent of q (constant returns to  skill), 
the level of human capital after investment is the initial level q augmented 
with A*. Because of Remark 7, there is only one optimal level of investment 
A*. If there were no perfect coordination, any level of investment could be 
supported in equilibrium. If all agents choose a level different from A*, the 
choice of this level will yield higher utility than  choosing A*, since no one else 
chooses A*. W ith  perfect coordination within the industry, this multiplicity 
is ruled out.
The optimal investment decision is illustrated in figure 5.3 for different
*
a:k*
Figure 5.3: Optimal Investment
sized industries. Consider one curve, representing the return on investment 
of an industry for a given 0. Because of constant returns to skill and from
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equation (5.17), the re tu rn  on investment, Vq =  q( 1 +  A)u>(0) — R f ( A ) q  can 
be decomposed into a component zv, independent of the initial hum an capital 
q, and a component q: Vq =  u(A)q. Hence, i'(A) =  q( 1 +  A)u>(0 ) — R f ( A). 
Since the cost of investment function /(• )  is strictly convex in  A  and the 
gains from investment (1 4- A)w(-) are linear in A, the re tu rn  on investment 
function Z'(A) is strictly concave, for A  E As a result, there will be 
a unique solution for A*. The solution always exists because / a (0) =  0 
and / ( 0) =  0: infinitesimally small amounts of investment have infinitely 
large returns which makes some investment always attractive. This is the 
mechanism which results in  a strictly positive growth rate of an  industry.
Given this technology, it follows th a t (still abstracting from the possibility 
of two groups merging) the chosen amount of investment of each individual 
w ithin an industry will be the optim al amount A*. We can now compare 
the growth rates of different industries, which by definition coincide w ith  
the amount of investment A. Because of the assumption of constant returns 
to skill, growth rates will, other things equal, be identical across different 
quality industries. However, in proposition 15 it is shown th a t the growth 
rate depends on the size of the industry.
P ro p o s it io n  15 The growth rate of an industry is increasing in the density 
of the workers with that level of human capital:
dA* n 
d<t>>
P ro o f. See appendix. ■
The intuition of proposition 15 is shown in figure 5.3. Since uz(-) is strictly 
increasing, the re tu rn  on investment function v  is strictly  higher for a higher 
density 0 . Figure 5.3 gives v  for three different densities, where 0 i <  02 <
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0i +  4>2- Proposition 15 is also illustrated graphically w ith  A j <  AJ. From 
proposition 15, it also follows th a t an  industry will have the maximal growth 
rate when all workers in the economy work in the same industry, i.e. when 
0 = 1 .  So far, we have concentrated on the optim al investment when no 
mobility between industries was possible. However, in  line w ith  the results 
from Section 5.2, the low types may be willing to  invest more th a n  A*, if 
they can join a higher quality industry and thus benefit from the externalities 
from a larger work force. As we have shown, the high types too benefit 
from the externality. Translated to  the repeated game w ith  investment by 
both  types, th is means th a t the high types may be willing to  invest less 
th an  optimal. However, the willingness to  over/under invest is bounded 
by the outside option, i.e. the re tu rn  when industries do not merge. The 
maximum/ minimum individuals are willing to invest has to  make them  a t 
least as well off as in the case of no industries merging. Hence the following 
definition which is also illustrated in  figure 5.3.
D efinition 5
A , =  {A  e  3?+ : +  AJ) -  R f (A J) =
u>(0i 4- 02)(1 +  A) — R f ( A ) ,  A  >  A j}
(maximal investment by q\ over and above AJ which makes her indifferent 
between the return in the merged (large) industry and the optimal return in 
the separate industry)
A i =  max{0, A G : u>(02)(1 4- AJ) -  Rf(A*2) =
w(0! 4- 0a)(l 4- A) -  R f ( A ) ,  A  <  AJ}
(minimal investment by q2 below AJ which makes her indifferent between the 
return in the merged (large) industry and the optimal return in the separate 
industry)
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We can now establish how the distribution will evolve over tim e and derive 
a sufficient condition for the limiting distribution.
P ro p o s it io n  16 A two industry economy with constant returns to skills will 
remain polarised into the two industries with a continuously decreasing ratio 
of human capital tending to zero at infinity, if both the following conditions 
hold:
1. 4>{qi) <  4>{<h) (necessary condition);
S. 9i ( l  +  A j) <  <^(1 +  A 2) (sufficient condition).
P ro o f . See Appendix. ■
The intuition behind Proposition 16 is the following. If industry two is 
larger (condition 1), it will grow faster th an  industry 1 (from Proposition 
15). A t the same time, the initial disparity between the two industries is 
so large th a t even after the q\ types have invested maximally and the qi 
types minimally, they are still not near enough to  merge. In  th a t case, the 
decentralised economy will not merge. The next period, the gap between 
the two industries is even bigger, because the larger industry grows faster 
because of condition 1. I t  follows th a t the gap increases over time.
C o ro lla ry  8 Given the conditions of Proposition 16. If the lower types do 
not merge with the higher types now, they will never do so.
This follows from the proof of Proposition 16. I t  is shown th a t condition 2 
holds even stronger in the next period, hence no mobility will occur. This ap­
plies for all consecutive periods, so mobility will never occur. Proposition 16 
provides us w ith  a sufficient condition for no mobility in  a decentralised sys­
tem. The result of the Proposition can easily be generalised to  an n  industry 
economy, as long as Proposition 16 holds between every of the neighbouring 
industries. Hence, we can formulate a general definition for a steady state.
133
D e fin itio n  6 An n industry economy is in a steady state if  either:
1. Proposition 16 applies n — 1 times, between every industry i and i +  1, 
i =  l...n  —l , n >  1; or
2. n — 1.
Once the steady state  does occur, there will be no changes in  the growth 
rates of the  different industries. Since Proposition 16 requires the higher 
quality industries to  be larger, they will grow a t a faster rate (from Proposi­
tion  15). This gives rise to  Proposition 17 about the inequality of the evolving 
distribution.
P ro p o s it io n  17 In the steady state of an n industry economy (n >  1), 
the normalised distribution of skills of the current generation stochastically 
dominates the distribution of next generation.
P ro o f . See Appendix. ■
This means th a t there is an  unambiguous increase in  inequality over time, 
in the sense th a t the Lorenz curves of any two consecutive generations do 
not intersect. Note th a t it cannot be shown th a t the Generalised Lorenz 
Curves (Shorrocks [67]) do not intersect, because the GLC takes into account 
bo th  first and second order stochastic dominanoe. The distribution w ith  the 
higher m ean (next generation’s distribution) can never be dominated by the 
distribution w ith  the lower m ean (current generation), whatever the variance.
C o ro lla ry  9 There is an unambiguous increase in the inequality of income.
N et income is given by Vq =  qu{A*). From condition 1 in  proposition 
16, (j) has to  be increasing in  q in the steady state  and from Proposition 15, 
v  will be increasing in q. As a result, if the distribution of q becomes more 
unequal, the distribution of qi/(A*) will become even more unequal.
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5.4 Conclusion
In  th is  Chapter, a general equilibrium framework has been developed which is 
used to  study mobility through education. The aim was to  study equilibria in 
the presence of a monopolistically competitive production technology. Gen­
erally, it can be concluded th a t mobility not only leads to  a higher income, 
bu t also gets the economy on a higher growth path.
In  the static game, coordination problems exist. Legislation on compul­
sory schooling can be considered as a way of coordinating strategies of agents. 
Even in the case of perfect coordination however, there is no mobility for a 
oertain range of skill in  the decentralised system, even though Pareto  im­
provements can be achieved. This is because the higher types experience a 
positive externality from mobility. There is a free rider problem which cannot 
be solved merely by inducing coordination.
W hen the basic game is repeated and the education technology is em­
bedded in  a constant growth economy, it emerges th a t the larger industries 
will grow faster. A sufficient condition for polarisation due to  lack of mo­
bility is derived. As the growth rate  of an  industry is increasing in  the size 
of the industry, this steady state  - i.e. no mobility - exhibits a low growth 
path. Moreover, over time, inequality in  the economy increases unequivo­
cally. The underlying reason for increasing inequality is the spread in  skills. 
Mobility is too costly and the emergence of a poverty trap  is possible. A 
higher growth p a th  - which increases intertem poral social welfare - can he 
achieved, but it requires an  intertem poral redistribution from the high types 
in the current generation to  all types in the future generations. Since the cost 
of adjustm ent is a function of the spread between the skill levels and since 
inequality increases over time, adjustm ent becomes more costly the  longer it 
is postponed.
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Though it is dangerous to  derive policy implications from a rigid model 
providing a simplified representation of reality, some general guidelines may 
be useful. In  the presence of some externality in production, i.e. when a com­
pact distribution is more efficient, the government has a role to  encourage 
maximal mobility. Of a long term  concern is the fact th a t no action now may 
cause irretrievable damage later. This is a particularly difficult dilemma be­
cause it involves intertem poral redistribution between the generations which 
is extremely costly for the currently skilled workers and thus an  unpopular 
measure to  impose.
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5.5 Appendix
P r o o f  o f  L e m m a  7
The system of equations can be simplified and yields an  explicit solution 
for as a function of 0  as follows. Define:
(A5.1)\  a<7 J <7 — 1 
Using equation (5.8), we can rewrite (5.2) and (5.3) respectively as:
x - ' - T T J l  ( a w >
Lsx  1-e - u L -  A wX  =  0 (A5.3)
(A5.2) and (A5.3) then  yield:
(4^) r_I (A5'4)
(5.9) and (A5.2) can be w ritten  as:
=  A6- 1 (A5.5)
(A5.4) and (A5.5) give us a very simple expression for L: L  =  <pQ (A5.6). 
Using th is and substituting in (A5.4) - i.e. rewriting the expression for A  
we find the following explicit solution for w as a function of (f)
<a5-7 »
Taking the partial derivative yields
(A5.8)
0 ( p  V <7 — 1 /  1 — <7 V Q<7 J  a<7
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Given a , /?, </> >  0; 0 <  0 <  1; er >  1; expression (A5.8) is positive. Since 
w — tog and w ith  dq/dcj) =  0, it follows th a t
| > °  (A5-9)
P roof o f Proposition  15
Equation (5.19) is derived from:
A* =  / 4 1 (-^w(0)9/i(g)-1)  (A5.10)
Derivation w ith  respect to  (j) gives:
3A* 1 du(<t>) q . j
~a* J ^ ~ d ^ R h(q) (A5 ' n )
From Lemma 7,
^ > 0  ,A5,2 ,
and w ith  h(q) and / a a  positive, it follows th a t
dA
d(f)
> 0 (A5.13)
P roof of Proposition 16
It follows from proposition 15 th a t condition 1 is necessary: the industry 
w ith the higher density has the higher growth rate. The condition is necessary 
because if violated, industry 1 will grow at least as fast and thus there will 
be no decrease in  the proportion of hum an capital. If the density a t q\ is 
strictly bigger th a n  a t q^ the proportion q\jq i will increase and eventually, 
the two industries will merge together.
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Condition 1 is not sufficient since there is the possibility th a t lower type 
individuals will bridge the gap between their levels of hum an capital and 
s ta rt producing the #2 quality good. Condition 2 refers to  the case where the 
gap between the two levels of hum an capital is so high th a t no investment 
will be made to  bridge the gap. In  term s of the extended model of section 
two - i.e. the dynamic version w ith  investment by all agents even w ithout 
social mobility case two applies.
Since the  cost of investment function is strictly convex in  A  and the gains 
from investment cj(-)(1 4-A) are linear in  A, the investment function Vq =  isq 
is strictly concave for A  in 3ft+ . Moreover, o;(*) is strictly increasing, so th a t 
A! and A 2 are uniquely defined. From condition two, it follows th a t type q\ , 
when investing the maximal individually rational amount, will never be able 
to  reach a level of hum an capital equal to  th a t of type <3*2, when the la tte r is 
investing the minimal individually rational amount.
Combination of the two conditions provides a sufficient condition for q i/q2 
to  be lower a t the end of stage two compared to  the beginning of stage one. 
In  the next generation, the distribution is exactly reproduced as it was a t 
the end of stage 2, so th a t condition one remains unchanged and condition 
two will hold even stronger because: 1. proposition 1 implies th a t q2 types
will invest more then  q\ types, which will drive down the q\jq% ratio; 2. since
A  is independent of the level of hum an capital wip rem ain unchanged.
This scenario will be repeated, and q i/q2 will continue to  decrease over time. 
Over an infinite number of future generations, q\jq i will tend to  zero, since
lim +  (A5.14)®(1 + AJ) v '
P roof o f Proposition 17
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The underlying social welfare function according to  which distributions 
are ranked is utilitarian. I t will be shown th a t the Lorenz curve of th is pe­
riod’s distribution is not lower th an  next period’s for all q. Note further th a t 
the usual assumptions about the underlying welfare function and individual 
utilities apply. In  term s of notation; next period’s variables will be marked
b y ’.
Starting from the following observations:
1. A* >  A*, V? >  v. by definition of steady state  and from proposition 1;
2. 4>(qi) =  (fi'(qi)- by definition of steady state;
3. 4i =  «(1 +  A*);
we can show th a t the share of to ta l income is never larger in  the next 
period:
E <*<£(<&) E<^ '(<?i)
\  >  ~k-----------, VA: =  l . . .n  (A5.15)
E®0(®) E ^ (« )
1 1
Inverting (A5.9) and using observations 2 and 3 gives
E E
1 +   <  1 +  ^  , Vfe =  1 ...n  (A5.16)
E ^ te) EoW'ta)
1 1
Dividing the num erator and denominator in  the RHS through by 1 +  AJ+1
gives
E»*(®) E « ( i?2£lV(«)
1 +  7 7  <  1 +  7 7 —7  ^ -------- » Vk =  (A5.17)
E ®*(«) E fth ^ -W t® )
1 1 \  fc+l /
From observation 1, it follows th a t 1 -f A* >  Vz >  k +  1, so th a t
the num erator of the RHS is higher th an  the one on the LHS. Similarly, 
1 +  A* <  1 +  A J+1, Vz <  k 4- 1, resulting in the denominator on the RHS
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being smaller th a n  the one on the LHS. Hence, the RHS is bigger th a n  the 
LHS, which proves (A5.15). ■
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